US Foreign Policy Toward Iran

[nerdgirl 0]

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Diplomacy is not always just bending over to see what you get

Altho' I would probably not express it in quite those specific terms, I concur.

While I think you know that I am less than enthusiastic about missile defense on scientific, technical and strategic grounds, you did identify another one of the areas that I think “both candidates have missed” – deterrence.

Point #3 of my recommendations for US Foreign Policy Toward Iran: Pursue both active and passive deterrence.

The latter – passive deterrence – is something with which the US (& much of the western world) has struggled because it’s not ‘sexy,’ it doesn’t have a strong lobbying interest behind it (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Boeing), and it takes patience.

Rather than continuing to invest ~$14B a year when the entire RDT&E budget for counter WMD work at DoD is only ~$16B … the remaining $2B is for everything from medical countermeasures (vaccines & therapeutics) for chem, bio, radiological, and nuclear; personal and collective protection across CBRN; decontamination across CBRN; all cooperative threat reduction across CBRN; and other *stuff* related to counter-WMD, the US should pursue other active and passive deterrence mechanisms.

Over the last almost 30 years active deterrence has been limited to missile defense. There are other approaches.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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You need pressure from Russia, China, the Brits, the EU, and Iran's ME neighbors.

Concur strongly. Iran’s Middle East and southwest Asian neighbors, as well as Russia and China, need to step up to the proverbial plate, especially on the nuclear weapons related dialogue and diplomacy.

Point #3 of my recommendations for US Foreign Policy Toward Iran: Pursue active multilateral engagement – via established multilateral institutions and discussions not just the EU-3.

Last week, Iran submitted a letter to the UN Secretary General and accompanying document titled “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations.”

There is nothing on suspending enrichment, but it does mention the possibility of "improved supervision by the IAEA," "joint collaboration over nculear safety and physical protection," encouraging other states to control nuclear-related equimpment, the establishment of "enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world, including Iran." Uh ... how about not Iran but IAEA fuel back yes. They're putting it out. Use it.

Again, it's probably not going to produce instant gratification of what "we" want. Maybe that's part of the problem -- good diplomacy rarely works on an MTV-esque timescale.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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I think that isolation has cost us dearly in the past, however, and don't like full blown isolation with regards to Iran either - or Cuba for that matter. Doha Round of trade talks might be something we could engage them on for a bit of US-Iranian cooperation. Anti-piracy efforts in the Arabian Gulf perhaps? Environmental issues might be something to discuss.

Saving the best – or potentially most incendiary, perhaps – for last.

Point #4 of my recommendations for US Foreign Policy Toward Iran: Direct Engagement

The next President should be the one offering the “carrots.” That’s important for US credibility in the Middle East and globally. The US also needs to be willing to follow through on those ‘carrots.’

“I think the President should discuss the following issues with the Mr. Ahmadinejad:”

Specific security assurances, i.e., no overt or covert attempts at regime change.

Proactive engagement of Iran on their role in Iraq. (Eventually a trilateral with Prime Minister of Iraq.) Iran is already there, whether as guest of Prime Minister Maliki or more covertly (to put it diplomatically). Make them overtly responsible for aiding in security and stabilization and be willing to share the credit – or, heck, give them all the credit – for successes along their border and in southern Iraq.

Unfreezing Iranian assets.

Lifting unilateral sanctions.

Concur w/r/t lower-level US bilaterals (or multilaterals) on some of the pieces you identified, as well as technology for modernizing Iran’s oil and natural gas industry.

One of – if not the biggest – vulnerability of Iran is connected to energy. We should exploit that for our benefit … & not in a ‘cowboy diplomacy manner.’ Iran is producing 300,000-500,000 barrels per day below its OPEC quota not because Iran’s leaders don’t want to meet the quota but because they can’t. Iran derives ~85% of its export income from oil sales. Those revenues constitute ~50% of the federal income.

Iran has already implemented domestic ‘conservation’/rationing efforts, partially for show, partially real, and partially for control of the populace.

This is a huge opportunity to leverage in pursuit of America’s foreign policy goals, especially the #1 goal I mentioned. It’s also potentially very lucrative for firms like Halliburton, Schlumberger, etc.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[kelpdiver 2]

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Former Iranian President Akbar Rafsanjani, who was much more pragmatic than Ahmadinejad, noted than Iran – because of geographic size and dispersed population – could survive many nuclear bombs exploding within its state; Israel, given its small size and concentrated population centers, may not even survive the detonation of one modern nuclear weapon.

Though Iran can tolerate X (where X is less than say, 10) nukes better than Israel, a single bomb in Tehran is pretty awful for the nation. Only if your standard is continuing to have a cultural existence does that exchange seem acceptable. Esp considering the Israeli arsenal may exceed 1000, and certainly is a few hundred.

Whenever someone suggests they can win an nuclear exchange, I suspect it is bluster.

However, Israel certainly won't leave MAD to chance, and will act well in advance, regardless of US or world opinion.

[kelpdiver 2]

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“I think the President should discuss the following issues with the Mr. Ahmadinejad:”

Specific security assurances, i.e., no overt or covert attempts at regime change.

I don't think any assurances will stop him from seeking nukes as they permamently reduce the risk of regime change from external forces.

[nerdgirl 0]

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“I think the President should discuss the following issues with the Mr. Ahmadinejad:”

Specific security assurances, i.e., no overt or covert attempts at regime change.

I don't think any assurances will stop him from seeking nukes as they permamently reduce the risk of regime change from external forces.

You are right that there are strong contemporary incentives for Iran see possession of nuclear weapons as as disincentive to military invasion, e.g., DPRK and its Oct 2006 'fizzle' versus its geographic neighbors.

One approach to make the disincentives greater than that incentive is sanctions and containment. It worked to get Libya to give up its offensive nuclear weapons programs, as well as Norway & Sweden but the latter two are more historical. For reasons I outlined briefly as well as the historical record of the last 28 years, don't see sanctions working for Iran.

Albeit there are some strong and experienced voices (e.g., Amb Dennis Ross) who will do make a strong case that effective coordinated sanctions (read: get China & Russia on board) will work. I differ.

So what do you see as being an effective way to get Iran to verifiably give up pursuit of nuclear weapons? Where would you start?

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Gawain 0]

If the President were to meet with Ahmadinejad, then it only strengthens Ahmadinejad.

That is not good considering that the relatively young population of Iran does not particularly care for their government.

To legitimize Ahmadinejad weakens the chances for reform.

I do not purport that this argument applies in every case though.

The people of Iran are the roots of what truly should be, the most natural cultural ally to the US in the region.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[kelpdiver 2]

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So what do you see as being an effective way to get Iran to verifiably give up pursuit of nuclear weapons? Where would you start?

I don't see a solution set - Iran's self interests are quite contrary to US interests. We can try to delay it as long as possible, possibly try to starve them economically (which is hard to do given their oil production). The Iraq solution (invade) might work short term, but certainly would encourage everyone to follow the North Korea model. If Libya's history was moved 20 years into the future, they'd not have abandoned.

Going to a policy with less use of force might lessen the drive to get nukes, but has consequences on the conventional front - encouraging the likes of al Queda to continue.

[nerdgirl 0]

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If the President were to meet with Ahmadinejad, then it only strengthens Ahmadinejad.

That is not good considering that the relatively young population of Iran does not particularly care for their government.

To legitimize Ahmadinejad weakens the chances for reform.

I do not purport that this argument applies in every case though.

The people of Iran are the roots of what truly should be, the most natural cultural ally to the US in the region.

I concur with much of your underlying analysis but not the conclusion.

Two counter-arguments:

The first, longer-term, comprehensive and more strategic: US foreign policy goals, strategy, and actions should not be about or driven by any single political personality, imo. What are our goals (ends) and how do we accomplish them (ways & means). It’s not about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The second counter-argument: If the President refuses to meet with Ahmadinejad, specifically *him,* then it only strengthens Ahmadinejad. When the US singles *him* out, it reinforces his personal empowerment as a counterweight to the US. You and I and most Americans may not care or perceive that, but the clerics, the Majlis, the Supreme Leader, the people of Iran, and much of the Middle East [another example] (sans Israel), Venezuela, Russia, Pakistan, Eritrea, etc do. While Eritrea may not seem particularly important, they all matter (& given al Qa’eda’s interest in East Africa, Eritrea might matter) to US foreign policy goals of decreasing spread of radical Islamic terrorism. Making it about him just feeds the anti-US Islamic ‘fighter’ image toward fulfillment of the 12th Iman prophecy that he wants to perpetuate throughout the Muslim world. It’s not about Ahmadinejad; it’s about the US foreign policy goals.

Ahmadinejad is a hurdle that needs to be managed. This is where execution of strategy moves to tactics. I agree that specific and cautious tactics need to be developed … perhaps not publicized. Direct engagement is with the person who is in the position of ‘democratically-elected’ head of the Islamic Republic of Iran not with “Mr. Ahmadinejad.” He needs to be managed carefully because he is very smart, and he may be delusional, e.g., his letter to President Bush. The first 4 pages are cogent (to be diplomatic), and the last 4 pages are not.

Ahmadinejad gets his effective power largely from the ruling clerics and the Majlis. (Of course, the Supreme Leader has final authority.) He’s risen up through local Tehran politics. Ahmadinejad and the hardline fundamentalism he represents must be seen as a liability to the clerics, the Majlis, and the Supreme Leader and to the populace, especially of Tehran. As much as I would love to be able to argue that the views of the people mattering more … well, that’s a nice ideal, but I’m more of a realist w/r/t strategy.) It would be an interesting case to explore in context of some suggestion that Ayatollah Khomeini may have ended war with Iraq after the popular support base in Tehran threatened with Iraqi missiles, altho’ I’m not sure if that would end up supporting your conclusion or mine.

If any US President meets with Ahmadinejad and is arrogant or dismissive of Iranian concerns that will strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hardliners. To be explicit, which I suspect you appreciate; strength is not equivalent to arrogance.

If Joe Smith or Jane Doe from the US foreign service or diplomatic corps acts like the ‘bad guy’ (or the ‘good guy’), it does not carry the same political weight as when it is the President.

Note: I incorrectly designated two #3 points/pillars – my error: deterrence should be #3, multilateral engagement should be #4 and direct engagement #5. Direct engagement is the last unseverable piece intentionally.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Gawain 0]

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The first, longer-term, comprehensive and more strategic: US foreign policy goals, strategy, and actions should not be about or driven by any single political personality, imo. What are our goals (ends) and how do we accomplish them (ways & means). It’s not about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In broad strokes, I agree with you, but in the "here and now" it is about Ahmadinejad. His power is rooted in his participation in the 1979 revolution and I believe his ties to the Mullahs are underestimated.

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The second counter-argument: If the President refuses to meet with Ahmadinejad, specifically *him,* then it only strengthens Ahmadinejad.

I disagree. An audience with our President is a huge credibility booster. It would be the same as a meeting with Kim Jong Il.

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When the US singles *him* out, it reinforces his personal empowerment as a counterweight to the US.

Not necessarily. When we publicly single Iran out, it also sounds a drum to the region. The US still has allies in the region, and they can resonate in other tones the meaning of US policy.

You and I and most Americans may not care or perceive that, but the clerics, the Majlis, the Supreme Leader, the people of Iran, and much of the Middle East [another example] (sans Israel), Venezuela, Russia, Pakistan, Eritrea, etc do. While Eritrea may not seem particularly important, they all matter (& given al Qa’eda’s interest in East Africa, Eritrea might matter) to US foreign policy goals of decreasing spread of radical Islamic terrorism.

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Making it about him just feeds the anti-US Islamic ‘fighter’ image toward fulfillment of the 12th Iman prophecy that he wants to perpetuate throughout the Muslim world.

Yet, that is not what Iran is doing. It is a full-throttle proxy war. Iran isn't just training tools to blow themselves up (like what comes across from Syria or via al Qaeda). Iran is involved in training Sadr's Militia and Shiites in Basra.

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It’s not about Ahmadinejad; it’s about the US foreign policy goals. Ahmadinejad is a hurdle that needs to be managed.

Ahmadinejad is not the only factor. It is his backers that we need to find chinks in the armor.

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This is where execution of strategy moves to tactics. I agree that specific and cautious tactics need to be developed … perhaps not publicized.

The US did attempt this. There was an earthquake a few years ago, killing over 20,000 in Iran. While they were accepting US aid, and we were willingly providing it, the State Department attempted to use the channel as a venue to see if a rapport could be developed. The door was slapped in the face.

I understand the rest of your meaning, but I do not believe that reform will come from a gentle touch...not in a region that from Morocco to Pakistan has been in decline for centuries. Just like the US though that favored-nation status would bring reform to China, it has not. China may have fostered economic reforms, but do not for one minute think that the government has released an iota of control. So too, in Iran.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[jcd11235 0]

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Direct engagement is with the person who is in the position of ‘democratically-elected’ head of the Islamic Republic of Iran not with “Mr. Ahmadinejad.” He needs to be managed carefully because he is very smart, and he may be delusional, e.g., his letter to President Bush. The first 4 pages are cogent (to be diplomatic), and the last 4 pages are not.

I didn't notice any real difference between the first half and the last half of the letter. To me, it read like an eight page sermon. In its comparison of the teachings of Christ and the actions of Bush, it was rational throughout. On the other hand, an attempt to use religion in an appeal from one nation's leader to another nation's leader is rather irrational.

Ahmadinejad didn't seem any more delusional in the letter than Bush has seemed at times these past seven years. Unfortunately, that's a pretty low bar.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[TheAnvil 0]

Hmmm...interesting as always, Marg, but I don't concur. I do think the US should assert leadership in the world while we're still able - especially on trade and environmental issues - but I don't think meeting with the Iranians at the presidential level is warranted given their current behavior. We could effect much of what you propose below that level - a public announcement by State that regime change in Iran is not a goal of US diplomacy/foreign policy would be a good thing, for example.

The Iranians are openly supporting Iraqi instability via material and fiscal support of insurgents there as well as instability in Lebanon and the deaths of Israeli citizens via Hezbollah terrorists. Unfreezing Iranian assets would simply facilitate more $$ flowing to Hezbollah and to their insurgency efforts in Iraq.

Lifting sanctions - partially; removing restrictions imposed by AECA and ITAR obviously wouldn't have my support - might be something to pursue in conjunction w/other trade talks, but not at the presidential level. I'm not sure how the sanctions are structured, but I think there's definitely some cooperation to be done there.

Iran right now is pumping tons of oil they can't refine due to high sulfur content I've been told (by a fellow I met who's in the oil industry on a RJA flight from Muscat to Amman). Perhaps there's some technology we could use to help them with that problem and do it within current technology transfer constraints or via a mechanism that would ensure nothing critical was transferred.

Engaging them on the future of Iraq could be a useful thing - again below the presidential level - and a way to entice them to cease their insurgency support. However, their memories of the recent war with Iraq will definitely give them a unique perspective on what that future should be. It would also make any Iranian cooperation w/Iraqis somewhat interesting to say the least. The Kuwaitis STILL hate the Iraqis and it makes cooperation difficult as HELL - even moving material through KU destined for Iraq is a royal pain in the arse.

Basically, I don't like the thought of POTUS engaging directly with a state sponsor of terrorism - especially with Hezbollah's behavior as of late.

Vinny the Anvil
Post Traumatic Didn't Make The Lakers Syndrome is REAL
JACKASS POWER!!!!!!

[nerdgirl 0]

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I understand the rest of your meaning, but I do not believe that reform will come from a gentle touch....

No one has put forth that argument in this forum. Deterrence, multilateral engagement, and direct bilateral engagement do not equal “gentle touch” or weakness.

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The US did attempt this. There was an earthquake a few years ago, killing over 20,000 in Iran. While they were accepting US aid, and we were willingly providing it, the State Department attempted to use the channel as a venue to see if a rapport could be developed. The door was slapped in the face.

Can you point me to some references regarding your account?

I am not familiar with that version nor can I find any open-source reference … altho’ I can see the value of it being put forth as such politically. And within that context much of the resistance makes sense.

Are you talking about US DepSecState Richard Armitage’s direct engagement via telephone calls with Iran's permanent envoy to UN after the December 2003 Bam earthquake w/r/t allowing US C-130s to land with humanitarian assistance and the 90-day suspension of US sanctions? President Bush denied that US had changed its policy towards Iran and explicitly stated that moves to help Iran post-earthquake did not indicate a thaw in relations but were purely humanitarian. Ayatollah Khamenei’s position was similar.

Or are you referring to the offer to send Sen Elizabeth Dole as part of a relief delegation in January 2004? Iran did decline that noting “the time was not right,” leaving open possibility of later negotiations. The State Department’s response: “We have heard back today from the Iranians that, given the current situation in Bam and all that is going on there now, it would be preferable to hold such a visit in abeyance [i.e., temporary inactivity or suspension]. Therefore, we are not pursuing it further at the moment.” An unspecified administration official has been quoted w/r/t the offer to send the delegation: “Political motives should not be read into it. Nor do we read political motives in the fact that the Iranians said it's not a good time to do it.” Is that what you mean by “slapped in the face”?

Compare the response to the Gilan earthquake of 1990. No aid was accepted, to direct conversations, whatsoever.


Here’s a pretty comprehensive list of US-Iran direct interactions since October 2001.

After September 11th, the Iranians made diplomatic advances w/r/t assistance against the Taliban. Iran wasn’t motivated by ideals, imo: they wanted to stop the influx of refugees from Afghanistan and they didn’t want US troops on their eastern border.

In his Oct03 testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2003, then DepSecState Armitage noted w/r/t Afghanistan:

“The Iranians have backed up that rhetoric with pledges of material support at both the Bonn and Madrid Donors’ Conferences and they continue to cooperate with regional counter-narcotics and refugee repatriation efforts. Although we make no conclusions about the nature of Iranian intent, we have encouraged such constructive behavior by engaging in direct dialogue on issues of mutual and immediate concern. This dialogue has been limited in scope and produced some success in the Afghanistan context.”

During questions, Armitage (a realist not a neo-conservative) acknowledged that the spring 2003 cease-fire agreement with the Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK) had been less than useful: “We shouldn’t have been signing a cease-fire with a foreign terrorist organization.” The point is not to be critical but to give him great credit for acknowledging and learning from a policy choice that seemed wise at the time (short-term) but had long-term unanticipated consequences. And to further doubts w/r/t the “door was slapped in [our] face” characterization.

Otoh, I familiar with and there are many available citations regarding the May 2003, overture the Iranian Foreign Ministry (their version of the State Dept) sent via the Swiss. It was rebuked (to put it diplomatically). We didn’t even respond.

Here’s a copy of what was sent to the State Dept’s Near East desk. An additional account from the Jerusalem Post US rejected Iranian overtures in 2003 & another from the Jewish Daily Forward. (I intentionally chose to cite 2 sources that would not have any perceivable pro-Iran bias.)

The conservative American Prospect commented that “Iran’s historic proposal for a broad diplomatic agreement should have prompted high-level discussions over the details of an American response.”

Amb Richard Haass (a realist), who advised SecState Colin Powell (a realist) as Director of Policy Planning and who was Special Assistant to Pres. GHW Bush (a hardcore realist) and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on National Security Council, has publicly stated that the Iranian overture was rejected because in the current administration “the bias was toward a policy of regime change” (the neo-conservative position).

Dr. Flynt Leverett, former senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council, counterterrorism expert on State Policy Planning Staff, & CIA senior analyst, called the May 2003 entrée a “respectable effort” to start negotiations with the US.

COL Larry Wilkerson, USA (ret) and former Chief of Staff for SecState Powell, said that it was a significant proposal for beginning “meaningful talks” between the US and Iran but that it “was a non-starter so long as Cheney was Vice President and the principal influence on Bush.” His version of events is that State supported the offer, however, “as soon as it got to the Vice President’s office, the old mantra of ‘We don’t talk to evil‘… reasserted itself” and Cheney’s office rejected it."

Former SecState Powell himself has commented publically:

“My position in the remaining year and a half [of his tenure as SecState] was that we ought to find ways to restart talks with Iran. But there was a reluctance on the part of the president to do that.” [W/r/t/ subsequent characterization of efforts by him and his deputies to deal with Tehran and Damascus as failures, Powell notes] “I don't like the administration saying, ‘Powell went, Armitage went ... and [they] got nothing.’ We got plenty.”

“You can't negotiate when you tell the other side, ‘Give us what a negotiation would produce before the negotiations start’.”

Days later after that attempt was rejected, Iran proposed a more limited exchange of al-Qaeda prisoners for MEK prisoners, which was rejected too.


To be explicit, Iran’s behavior is not motivated because they want to be an upstanding member of the international community, imo. They’re driven by competition for (scarce) resources in a struggle for power among competitors and struggle for regional influence. We are one of the competitors. They’re driven by history and religious fundamentalism.

And the point is not to be an apologist for Iran (hell, no!), but to illustrate with enough credible conservative realist voices (as opposed to neoconservative) how much isn’t in the dialogue. And how far conservative realist foreign policy differs from neoconservative.

Imo, it’s not about perceived affronts to the US ego or pride, even if they didn't occur; it’s about maximizing the likelihood of accomplishing US foreign policy goals. Again, that why figuring out what the goal(s) is to start with is so critical. Then strategy and finally tactics.

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Just like the US though that favored-nation status would bring reform to China, it has not. China may have fostered economic reforms, but do not for one minute think that the government has released an iota of control. So too, in Iran.

When President Nixon met with Mao in 1972 what was the goal of the meeting? Normalizing relations. Secondary was security situations, south east Asia and Taiwan.


Do you think that “reform” or regime change should be the number 1 goal of US foreign policy toward Iran?

If so, by what ways and means would you recommend the next President pursue that goal?

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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The Iranians are openly supporting Iraqi instability via material and fiscal support of insurgents there as well as instability in Lebanon and the deaths of Israeli citizens via Hezbollah terrorists. Unfreezing Iranian assets would simply facilitate more $$ flowing to Hezbollah and to their insurgency efforts in Iraq.

How would you propose going about decreasing both?
I don't see any easy solutions.

For clarification, unfreezing assets should be a "carrot" to be put on the table as part of discussions (step 5). The specifics need a lot more consideration. Some non-trivial percentage of the frozen assets were returned after the hostages were released in 1981.

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Lifting sanctions - partially; removing restrictions imposed by AECA and ITAR obviously wouldn't have my support -

Concur heartily!

As you probably know, ITAR & AECA are restrictions not sanctions. In quite a few cases, export to *all* countries is forbidden, including close allies.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[joedirt 0]

Invite ahmadinejad and his supreme leader to the white house for barbecue shrimp and coronas. At the same time send kermit roosevelt jr jr jr to tehran on vacation just to see what happens.

[TheAnvil 0]

Clicky

Read this and it sparked a synapse WRT this thread.

This is why I think it will be difficult to reduce Iranian support. They've dedicated themselves to instability in Iraq and Lebanon. Maintaining that instability is a key component of their foreign policy apparently, regardless of its human toll. What we desire is to have them take a 180 on that. Regardless of what promises we elicit as part of bargaining at any level, they are 99% likely not to keep them.

Vinny the Anvil
Post Traumatic Didn't Make The Lakers Syndrome is REAL
JACKASS POWER!!!!!!

[SpeedRacer 1]

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They've dedicated themselves to instability in Iraq . Maintaining that instability is a key component of their foreign policy apparently, regardless of its human toll.

Interesting. I've been reading blogs & articles from Arabs & others in the Islamic world. They say the same thing about us: ie, that we are DELIBERATELY making sure that Iraq remains unstable, so that we can use it as an excuse for our continued military presence there.

Speed Racer
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[TheAnvil 0]

Some would say that, I would imagine. I have a few friends over there - Lebanese, UAE, and Bahraini - and spent a bit of time touring around Jordan and Oman. Didn't hear or read anything of that nature.

Vinny the Anvil
Post Traumatic Didn't Make The Lakers Syndrome is REAL
JACKASS POWER!!!!!!

[nerdgirl 0]

Last week the Washington Post featured an Op-ed “ A Sensible Path on Iran ” by Zbigniew Brzezinski and LTG William Odom, USA (ret) offering their recommendations US foreign policy on Iran's nuclear program – learn to live with it.

Nota bene: LTG Odom was director of the National Security Agency (NSA) under Pres. Reagan. He was characterized as a “hardliner” for his opposition to diplomacy with the Soviets. He also opposed US military action against Iraq in 2003. LTG Odom died this past Friday (natural causes), two days after the Op-Ed ran - his WP obituary.

Excerpts from A Sensible Path on Iran :

“Current U.S. policy toward the regime in Tehran will almost certainly result in an Iran with nuclear weapons. The seemingly clever combination of the use of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots,’ including the frequent official hints of an American military option ‘remaining on the table,’ simply intensifies Iran’s desire to have its own nuclear arsenal. Alas, such a heavy-handed ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ policy may work with donkeys but not with serious countries. The United States would have a better chance of success if the White House abandoned its threats of military action and its calls for regime change.

“Consider countries that could have quickly become nuclear weapon states had they been treated similarly. Brazil, Argentina and South Africa had nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, each for different reasons. Had the United States threatened to change their regimes if they would not, probably none would have complied. But when ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ failed to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States rapidly accommodated both, preferring good relations with them to hostile ones. What does this suggest to leaders in Iran?

“To look at the issue another way, imagine if China, a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a country that has deliberately not engaged in a nuclear arms race with Russia or the United States, threatened to change the American regime if it did not begin a steady destruction of its nuclear arsenal. The threat would have an arguable legal basis, because all treaty signatories promised long ago to reduce their arsenals, eventually to zero. The American reaction, of course, would be explosive public opposition to such a demand. U.S. leaders might even mimic the fantasy rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding the use of nuclear weapons.”

“A successful approach [i.e., US foreign policy] to Iran has to accommodate its security interests and ours. Neither a U.S. air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities nor a less effective Israeli one could do more than merely set back Iran's nuclear program. In either case, the United States would be held accountable and would have to pay the price resulting from likely Iranian reactions. These would almost certainly involve destabilizing the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, and serious efforts to disrupt the flow of oil, at the very least generating a massive increase in its already high cost. The turmoil in the Middle East resulting from a preemptive attack on Iran would hurt America and eventually Israel, too.

“Given Iran’s stated goals -- a nuclear power capability but not nuclear weapons, as well as an alleged desire to discuss broader U.S.-Iranian security issues -- a realistic policy would exploit this opening to see what it might yield. The United States could indicate that it is prepared to negotiate, either on the basis of no preconditions by either side (though retaining the right to terminate the negotiations if Iran remains unyielding but begins to enrich its uranium beyond levels allowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty); or to negotiate on the basis of an Iranian willingness to suspend enrichment in return for simultaneous U.S. suspension of major economic and financial sanctions.

“Such a broader and more flexible approach would increase the prospects of an international arrangement being devised to accommodate Iran's desire for an autonomous nuclear energy program while minimizing the possibility that it could be rapidly transformed into a nuclear weapons program.

“Moreover, there is no credible reason to assume that the traditional policy of strategic deterrence, which worked so well in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with China and which has helped to stabilize India-Pakistan hostility, would not work in the case of Iran. The widely propagated notion of a suicidal Iran detonating its very first nuclear weapon against Israel is more the product of paranoia or demagogy than of serious strategic calculus. It cannot be the basis for U.S. policy, and it should not be for Israel's, either.”

The easy criticism of Brzezinski and Odom’s is that the type of “Grand Bargain” which they are proposing is difficult (although not impossible) to verify.

There is credible evidence Iran has even supplied the insurgents with weapons. As the geo-political situation exists now (read: strong US influence) Iran does not want “stability” that leaves “independent” (or US proxy) states east and west. The Iranian regime (government) wants regimes (government) favorable to their advancing their regional (if not global aspirations) hegemony.

Just as the US shouldn’t pursue military action just ‘because we can;’ the US should not pursue diplomacy just ‘because we can’ or ‘because we haven’t done it before.’ All of those approaches represent an intellectually and strategically lazy approach to national security, im-ever-ho.

US foreign policy toward Iran needs to identify where and how leverages by the US (& by extension western world) can influence Iran’s government.

US foreign policy toward Iran is a complex (heck, almost convoluted) task in a very complex situation (geographically) that isn’t going to be solved by saber-rattling, which I think is the point of the Op-Ed.


Almost concurrently, Iran’s Parliament elected the Ali Larijani as the new speaker of parliament last week. Larijani “ is seen as a key conservative rival to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and may use his post to launch a presidential campaign for next year.” Speaker is a one-year term.

Larijani resigned in October 2007 as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, after disagreements with Ahmadinejad.

Larijani is a conservative not a reformer. In contrast to Ahmadinejad’s ideological fundamentalism, Larijani is more of a pragmatic realist. Larijani is also close to Ayatollah Khamenei. Given Iran’s flailing economy – Ahmadinejad is losing favor because he’s failing to appreciate that even in Iran, all politics is local. There are opportunities.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[Gawain 0]

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Just like the US though that favored-nation status would bring reform to China, it has not. China may have fostered economic reforms, but do not for one minute think that the government has released an iota of control. So too, in Iran.

When President Nixon met with Mao in 1972 what was the goal of the meeting? Normalizing relations. Secondary was security situations, south east Asia and Taiwan.

Do you think that “reform” or regime change should be the number 1 goal of US foreign policy toward Iran?

If so, by what ways and means would you recommend the next President pursue that goal?

Yet, President Nixon did not do that. Even Kissenger did not push that agenda. President Ford did not continue that line of thought either. It was President Carter that created formal ties with PRC, forcing a formal cut with ROC-Taiwan.

Since then, China has stated repeated rhrtoric of its right to a "one China".

Back to Iran, they have shrugged off both sanctions and carrots from the UN, Europe, the US and Russia. The IAEA, despite the US NIE, says that there is compelling evidence that Iran is not in a peaceful framework with its nuclear program.

Iran is partially following North Korea's model, Kim Jong Il got what he wanted, oil, food, aid....for nothing, despite repeated abandonment of their agreements with ROK, and other nations.

Our policies must find a way to force Iran to focus inward. Distract away from Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[kallend 2,030]

Well, invading Iran's neighbor didn't seem to do any good (the opposite, in fact).

Here's an interesting view:

www.southbendtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080601/Opinion/806010593/1065/Opinion

...

The only sure way to survive a canopy collision is not to have one.

[nerdgirl 0]

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When President Nixon met with Mao in 1972 what was the goal of the meeting? Normalizing relations. Secondary was security situations, south east Asia and Taiwan.

Do you think that “reform” or regime change should be the number 1 goal of US foreign policy toward Iran?

If so, by what ways and means would you recommend the next President pursue that goal?

Yet, President Nixon did not do that. Even Kissenger did not push that agenda. President Ford did not continue that line of thought either. It was President Carter that created formal ties with PRC, forcing a formal cut with ROC-Taiwan.

Since then, China has stated repeated rhrtoric of its right to a "one China".

I’m not sure to what part you are replying here. I’m reading your response as you agree that President Nixon met with Mao in 1972 with the goal to initiate diplomacy on normalizations of relations between the two states and to address the principal security situations of the time, i.e., southeast Asia & Taiwan. And recognition that diplomacy takes time, e.g., the Taiwan Relations Act was not signed and ratified (nevermind the SCOTUS case) until >6 years later, that the actions of one administration can have strong impact on later administrations, and that normalization of relations for increased security is non-partisan.

SecState Kissinger -- as a master of realpolitik -- had little to no interest in regime change or pro-democratic movements. His interest was in regimes/governments that would cooperate beneficially with the US in support of US foreign policy goals, e.g., Latin America policy of the 1970s supporting less than upstanding representatives of free democracies, such as General Pinochet’s regime in Chile, with the oppressive military junta in Argentina, Uruguay, etc.

I’m not sure that’s what you intended, tho’.

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Our policies must find a way to force Iran to focus inward. Distract away from Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria.

Why? (Not trying to agree or disagree here but to understand your thinking.)

What do you see as the US imperative to force Iran to focus inward?


I laid out some initial points that could be used: In my post (#47) outlining US foreign policy goals toward Iran (i.e., what I think they should be), Goal #2 is “Ending Iranian support for terrorist groups. Stop providing equipment, training, and other tacit support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and other regional militias.”

In the post above your response and in post #53, I cited economic pressures that may destabilize Iran. It’s not clear whether those economic pressures will strengthen or weaken the conservative or the reformist position. I would assert that the more Ahmadinejad can push the internal debate on Iran’s economic troubles to “the evil US/the great Satan,” (i.e., a real case of “blame the US”) the stronger the hardline, fundamentalist, conservative position will be … & make it more difficult for achieving US foreign policy goals. From a strategic/national security perspective, in the end achieving US foreign policy goals are what I’m most interested in (… by lawful, ethical, reasonable means).


The idealist argument is that Iran is a repressive theocratic dictatorship. They are evil. Therefore it is the US responsibility to push for regime change. Is that the reasoning that you would recommend for the next US administration and should regime change be the top US foreign policy goal?

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[jcd11235 0]

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The idealist argument is that Iran is a repressive theocratic dictatorship. They are evil.

I found it interesting that Iran has, in recent past, proven themselves to adopt realist policies over idealist theocratic policies when necessary.

From July 5, 2005 Washington Post's AIDS Crisis Brings Radical Change In Iran's Response to Heroin Use:

Fearing an AIDS epidemic, Iran's theocratic government has dropped a zero-tolerance policy against increasingly common heroin use and now offers addicts low-cost needles, methadone and a measure of social acceptance.
…

Supporters of the government's new approach laud it as practical and devoid of the wishful thinking and moralism that they contend hampers policies on drug abuse and AIDS in some other countries, including the United States. "I have to pay tribute to Iran on this," said Roberto Arbitrio, head of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Tehran.
…

Ayatollah Mohammad Esmail Shoshtari, the justice minister who has shut more than 100 newspapers and imprisoned political opponents, instructed prosecutors in a Jan. 24 letter to ignore laws on the books and defer to Iran's Health Ministry to counter the spread of AIDS and hepatitis C.
…

The policy demonstrates the complexities of Iran a quarter-century after the Islamic revolution and U.S. Embassy takeover that still defines its theocratic government for many Americans. Though power remains concentrated in unelected clerics who brook little political dissent, the government has demonstrated flexibility on a variety of subjects, including birth control and sex-change operations, which the clerics recently authorized.

After the revolution, Iran treated drug users as criminals, throwing hundreds of thousands of them in jail. Now it has joined the ranks of countries that acknowledge the difficulty of eradicating drug addiction and focus instead on curbing the most immediate dangerous behaviors that go with it.
…

Robert Newman, director of the Baron Edmond de Rothschild Chemical Dependency Institute at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York, said Iranian policies are "in very dramatic contrast to what has been happening with increasing frequency in America, where the judiciary and the criminal justice system in general . . . does not let the patients receive the treatment that the physician says is necessary."

Newman, who has traveled twice to Iran in the last five years to consult on addiction programs, said only a quarter of an estimated 900,000 heroin addicts in the United States receive treatment. He attributes that in large part to laws that restrict methadone to large-scale treatment facilities. "In other words, the AIDS epidemic has done nothing to open the way for treatment with methadone or any other treatment for heroin addiction" in the United States, Newman said.

While such an example says little about Iran's foreign policy or their policy regarding terrorism, it does offer some insight regarding how the leaders prioritize theocratic idealism with the well being of the population.

We need to keep in mind that, while Iran's leaders may not share the same ideals of Western leaders, we cannot assume Iran's leaders are irrational or absolutely idealist to the complete exclusion of realism.

As long as we treat Iran as an "evil" (to quote Bush) country, there is little hope for improvement of our mutual relationship, including their active or tacit support of insurgents fighting our military in the region. We need to show Iran the respect we want to receive, even if we have to swallow our pride a little bit to accomplish that. In the long term, that is the superior strategy.

Math tutoring available. Only $6! per hour! First lesson: Factorials!

[nerdgirl 0]

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Here's an interesting view:

www.southbendtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080601/Opinion/806010593/1065/Opinion

Thanks for passing that along. I probably would not have seen it otherwise.

As the Presidency of GHW Bush (Sr) is moving into history (>10y) and some thoughtful historical evaluations are appearing. I have been most impressed looking back at his subtle diplomatic choices and the underlying wisdom toward the Soviet Union in dealing with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

[nerdgirl 0]

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From July 5, 2005 Washington Post's AIDS Crisis Brings Radical Change In Iran's Response to Heroin Use:



While such an example says little about Iran's foreign policy or their policy regarding terrorism, it does offer some insight regarding how the leaders prioritize theocratic idealism with the well being of the population.

Does it? Really? Or were rationalizations/explanations found within religious text on which to base the domestic policy? I don’t know enough about Iranian domestic drug policy and enforcement to comment authoritatively and it wasn't addressed in the article; I can pose the question that has been the case w/other domestic policies.

One, two, or 178 examples of Iranian progressive domestic policies would not change my fundamental opposition to fundamentalist theocracies. By counter-example, I disagree with the UK’s domestic policy of banning most privately owned handguns; I wouldn’t advocate for US foreign policy toward the UK to support regime change (or not advocate for regime change) based on that domestic policy. I agree with those that assert that the Iranian regime is repressive. That’s not the sole or critical point on which I would recommend basing US foreign policy nor should be the US foreign policy priority toward Iran. (My recommended US foreign policy priorities: No nuclear weapons in Iran, ending Iranian support for terrorist groups, & decreasing the risk of diversion of civilian nuclear capabilities to offensive nuclear weapons programs.)

Thanks for the link. The story does highlight that the Iranian Supreme Leader is open to rational behavior in the interest of his nation’s stability. The negative impact of AIDS on stability and security of states has been shown repeatedly.

The article mentions the rise on heroin use as connected to the Taliban in Afghanistan:

“Heroin use rose abruptly about five years ago [2000], when the Taliban rulers in neighboring Afghanistan sharply reduced opium production. That drove up the price of opium, leading people who had been smoking or swallowing it to switch to heroin, which remained comparatively cheap. Because heroin is often injected, the switch resulted in a surge of HIV infections as users shared needles.”

After the Taliban were removed from (total) control, opium production surged and they (the Taliban) changed their policy as illicit sales became its principal market commodity. President Karzai has rejected US requests for aggressive eradication efforts, i.e., spraying glyphosate, aka “RoundUp.” What has led to a decrease in poppy cultivation for illegal drugs? The recent increase in food commodity prices.

“In parts of Helmand Afghan farmers are this year sowing wheat instead of poppy - not because they have suddenly been converted to the argument that producing heroin is not in the national interest.

“Market forces have been the deciding factor - with wheat prices doubling in the past year, and the street price of heroin falling, it is now more cost effective to grow wheat.”

Undermining the Taliban and security & stabilization of Afghanistan’s government are the US foreign policy priorities for Afghanistan. Decreasing opium cultivation is another US foreign policy goal w/r/t Afghanistan (& its connection to the two priorities are recognized).

No one proposed that any part of US strategy to accomplish those goals be to instigate a global food “crisis.” But the rise in food commodity prices is having that effect. How is the Iranian domestic drug policy impacted by that? I wouldn’t recommend US foreign policy on Iran include either flooding Iran with heroin or instigating a global food "crisis."

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… the superior strategy.

Nota bene: “Tit for Tat” isn’t a realist international relations “theory.” It’s part of regime “theory,” which is liberal or neo-liberalist. And that’s “theory” in the social science meaning of the word not the physical science usage.

VR/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying