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nerdgirl

“Obama’s strategic blind spot”

By nerdgirl, in Speakers Corner

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nerdgirl    0

nerdgirl
Prof Andrew Bacevich (Boston U) has an Op-Ed in today’s LA Times on US involvement in Afghanistan, “Obama’s Strategic Blind Spot.” (Great title, imo, altho’ the LA Times editors probably came up with it not Prof Bacevich.)

He mixes in historical references to WWI with his analysis of the Global War on Terror. His core argument is against what he calls “wars of choice” rather than limiting US involvement to “wars of necessity” and outlines four five [apparently I can't count on Wed morning] principles that he asserts should be requirements before engaging in foreign expeditionary warfare.

Some excerpts, altho’ I strongly encourage reading the entire Op-Ed – it’s only 824 words long:
“The eighth anniversary of 9/11, now fast approaching, invites attention to a similar question: Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to choke on the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan?

“As President Obama shifts the main U.S. military effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, and as his commanders embrace counterinsurgency as the new American way of war, the big questions go not only unanswered but unasked. Does perpetuating the Long War make political or strategic sense? As we prepare to enter that war’s ninth year, are there no alternatives?

“The urgent need is for the administration to articulate a concrete set of organizing precepts -- not simply cliches -- to frame basic U.S. policy going forward.

“What should those principles be?

“First, the Long War may be long, but it should not get any bigger. The regime-change approach -- invade and occupy to transform – hasn’t worked; simply trying harder in some other venue (Somalia? Sudan?) won’t produce different results. In short, no more Iraqs.

“Second, forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.

“Third, no more crusades unless the American people buy in; expecting a relative handful of soldiers to carry the load while the rest of the country binges on consumption is unconscionable. At a minimum, the generation that opts for war should pay for it through higher taxes rather than foisting a burden of debt onto their grandchildren.

“Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a ‘mighty fortress is our God’; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.

“Fifth, by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy. Yet we’re more likely to enjoy success by modeling freedom rather than trying to impose it. To provide a suitable model, we’ve considerable work to do here at home.

“Now, some may view these principles as inadequate. Fair enough: Come up with something better. The point is that unless we get the fundamentals right -- and we haven’t since the Cold War ended -- the United States may yet share the fate suffered by Churchill’s Britain, reduced from engine to caboose in the course of his own political career. Those are the consequences of strategic drift.

“Obama has appointed czars for a host of issues, his administration today employing more czars than have occupied the Kremlin throughout its history. Yet there is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.”
I heartily concur with Prof Bacevich that we have not elaborated a strategy. Broad goals (ends) have been put forth. We’re applying what is fundamentally a military strategy (counterinsurgency/COIN) to the conduct operations. COIN only takes one so far. I also concur with his criticism of “Czar’s” for lots of reasons, fundamentally because they undermine the institutions.

I also love Bacevich’s challenge to come up with one’s own fundamentals for constructing strategy. Largely because I’m not sure I agree unilaterally with his principles. Particularly w/r/t differentiating metrics for what is a “war of necessity” versus “wars of choice.” The simplest metric is 'were we attacked'? If one uses that metric, a number of US wars and other military actions would not qualify as "necessity” from Korea to Gulf War I. So I don't think that's an adequate metric. What is?

What do you think? Is Prof Bacevich on the right track or not? What does he get wrong and why? What do you think he gets right and why?

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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BDashe    0

BDashe
Another way to look at it is (and this is from poli-sci 2xx? from a few years back, history of war or some such thing) but this is the first, or moving into the second now, century of wars of conscience vs wars of necessity. wars of conscience in this case would be this professor's 'wars of choice.'

Expanding on your questions, the scary thing is it is all dependent on who is in charge/in control of deciding to deploy our troops.

Right now there is a huge grass roots movement to intervene in Sudan. Is it our business? That is debateable. Based on our track record of waltzing around the world as democracy police, then yes. Does it expand our interests? Not really. Does it eat at our conscience knowing we could probably fix it? Of course.

Then you get into the slippery slope of 'are we really the world's police?' If so, we'll be stretched thin trying to keep a strong front on every war of conscience, so it comes back to which ones do we chose?

Ultimately, in my opinion, it is whoever has the most influence in office to use these wars as a guise to further personal interests (political, financial, etc.), or interests of the country he/she is representing.

Sadly, our soldiers lose no matter what, though they may win battles and wars, as they have the least choice in where they go. They have gotten no rest in the last 8 years, and if we keep pace with engaging in wars of conscience, they won't get any for a long time to come.
So there I was...

Making friends and playing nice since 1983

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Beachbum    0

Beachbum
I also see that "necessity vs. choice" as a big problem with that. Who decides, and based on what criteria? I think that distinction not only varies significantly from person to person, but I'd bet that the overall concensus view of it changes from generation to generation. What constitutes "attack" could also play into that. Must it be an actual military attack, or would something like a serious economic threat be within guidelines as well? It will take someone who has given a lot more thought to this than I have to come up with a method that is functional long term!!
As long as you are happy with yourself ... who cares what the rest of the world thinks?

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jcd11235    0

jcd11235
Quote

I heartily concur with Prof Bacevich that we have not elaborated a strategy. Broad goals (ends) have been put forth. We’re applying what is fundamentally a military strategy (counterinsurgency/COIN) to the conduct operations. COIN only takes one so far. I also concur with his criticism of “Czar’s” for lots of reasons, fundamentally because they undermine the institutions.

I also love Bacevich’s challenge to come up with one’s own fundamentals for constructing strategy. Largely because I’m not sure I agree unilaterally with his principles. Particularly w/r/t differentiating metrics for what is a “war of necessity” versus “wars of choice.” The simplest metric is 'were we attacked'? If one uses that metric, a number of US wars and other military actions would not qualify as "necessity” from Korea to Gulf War I. So I don't think that's an adequate metric. What is?

What do you think? Is Prof Bacevich on the right track or not? What does he get wrong and why? What do you think he gets right and why?



I think he's definitely on the right track. I generally agree with his choice versus necessity point, although I'm also not sure that I agree with his metric, perhaps for different reasons than you.

I would consider Operation Desert Storm a war of choice and not one of necessity. Operation Iraqi Liberation Freedom is also a war of choice, as is Operation Enduring Freedom. I generally agree with Prof Bacevich's assertion that we haven't gotten the fundamentals right since the Cold War ended (longer than that, IMO, e.g. Viet Nam).

I'm reminded of the words of President Eisenhower:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

We (the USA) have become much too eager to go to war rather than make good faith efforts to resolve problems in more appropriate manners.
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lawrocket    3

lawrocket
I am in general concurrence with you, good nerdgirl.

Quote


?wars of choice? rather than limiting US involvement to ?wars of necessity?



Here is agree - what is "choice" versus "necessity" is highly subjective. Cheney has spent years arguing that the war in Iraq and the "war on Terror" was and is necessary.

[Reply]Does perpetuating the Long War make political or strategic sense? As we prepare to enter that war?s ninth year, are there no alternatives?



This is interesting to me in that his first factor can be subtitled "hindsight." A mere 7 years ago it was "mission accomplished." As wars drag on, they seem less and less necessary and "alternatives" look more and more "desirable" and "necessary."


[Reply] no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.



As stated above, "necessity" and "vital interests" are subjective. Heck, a "war for oil" is a vital US interest, aint it?


[Reply]no more crusades unless the American people buy in



Again, the hindsight thing. The majority of the American people DID buy in - and for a while. Bush staked his presidency on this war and won re-election.

Look at the differences between now and 1990. Look at the differences between 1970 and 1990 (Jeez - the time beween the end of Vietnam and Gulf I is less than between the end of Gulf I and now).

In 65, LBJ went with the draft option and did not utilize the reserves. When Total Force became the doctrine in the 70's and 80's there became new and different political consequences. A POTUS could not deploy the Reserves or Nat'l Guard without strong political support.

In fact, until Gulf I, no POTUS had ever done so. Because so much combat support/ combat service support was tied up with reserves, no large conflict could occur without the RC/NG. That required deploying mommy and daddy and taking them from their jobs.

So, there has to be massive support to go to war. This support was there in the beginning (not from me, mind you, but I cannot in good faith argue the majority of the American public did not support it.)

Now, this support has faded dramatically. This is my key problem - the article written in the present tense, as if to suggest that thinking and opinion were always the same.

Obviously, a side effect of the RC involvement was that there are people like me who faced the constant threat of deployment for SASO (nee OOTW)operations. Deploying smaller numbers of RC forces and the requirements for same led me to conclude that I could not be a soldier and a civilian.


[Reply]the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world.



This is an interesting and, I believe, accurate at [I]this time. Still, things have changed and fairly certainly will change again.

It seems that the last couple of administrations have not deviated from the containment model seen during the Cold War. I believe that the modern face of world power requires a move from containment to a different strategy.


[Reply]by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy.



This is tough. How?


[Reply]There is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.?



Hasn't this job usually been called "Secretary of State?" With assistance from the "Secretary of Defense" and the "Joint Chiefs?"

I think he is on the right track. But I think his problem is that too much of his article comes down to hindsight - using what are now unpopular situations that, according to his rules, seemed appropriate at the time.

I don't think our goals have been properly enunciated or limited. The article suggests that we should examine the proper use of military force. It also suggests that we should spread democracy.

It's a bit of a disambiguation, I think.


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