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nerdgirl

“Obama’s strategic blind spot”

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/Marg … p.s. “poli-sci 2xx?” is further along in a social science curriculum than I ever got; I was over in the chem & physics labs. B|



Noyes and Loomis eh?

I was more of an Everitt and Altgeld kinda person.


Transportation Building, represent!!!!!!!!


LOL - twice

You guys crack me up. :D:DB|

(Does this make us part of a cornfield clique? :P)

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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This guy is a professor at BU? Professor of what?



Replying as if that was a genuine question: International Relations and History, with specialization in American Diplomatic and Military History, U. S. Foreign Policy, and Security Studies.

I’ve cited Bacevich a few times. Bacevich, along with COL Gian Gentile, USA and COL Ralph Peters, USA (ret), has emerged as one of the most thoughtful, imo, critics of the shift to COIN-driven military policy for Afghanistan (which I support) and in planning and consolidation/expansion of power in the executive branch. Bacevich, Peters, and Gentile argue for policy with which I regularly do not agree, but they almost always make me think.


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So, on the whole, I disagree with this "professor".



Perhaps I’m reading your ASCII text connotations incorrectly – therefore I’m asking for clarification – are you mocking him and his title &/or job?

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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Bush, I think, really laid some groundwork [w/r/t Iran].



Interesting argument. As a skilled litigator, I'm also confident that you could build an argument that the actions made it more difficult because of the unintentional strengthening of Ahmadinejad domestically (Iran domestic politics).



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Now Obama is, I think, playing it right. The Iranian government is desperate to blame America, and there's Obama providing no ammunition. None.

Obama is not stoking nor suppressing. For Obama to take steps is not necessary - we saw what happened when he simply shut up!



Concur.

As do a good number of the US foreign policy hardcore realists.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



I don’t understand your statement … on multiple levels but I'll limit my responses to the Honduran military-backed coup comments.


*If* the US had supported the military-backed & executed deposing of a democratically-elected leader during his lawful term without any trial that *would* have been a double standard or “dichotomy.” If we would have turned a metaphorical ‘blind eye’ to the actions of an ally, that would enable criticism of having different standards for our friends than our non-friends.

Forcefully removing a democratically-elected leader -- while still in his jammies – and exiling him, during his elected term, to a foreign state is counter to the rule of law. That would be a tacit indication to Iranian leaders that the US has a double standard for our allies as opposed to them.

Ignoring or even supporting the military-backed coup in Hondurus would have been on par with soldiers from the US Army breaking into the White House in early 1974, forcing Pres Nixon at gunpoint onto a plane, and dropping him off in Canada without an impeachment hearing. That would have been very wrong. And that would have been a violation of rule of law too.

If you want to argue that the US should depose someone based on politics, that is not unprecedented. Not even unprecedented in Central and South America. It is, however, counter to the rule of law. And sets up a legitimate accusation of double standard.

By supporting the return of Mr Zelaya to Honduras to be charged and tried (rather than dumped in Costa Rica in his pjs), that undermines powerful Iranian domestic arguments of folks like Ahmadinejad that the US has a double standard of foreign policy. Pragmatically, in the long run, Mr. Zelaya's removal is probably not going to matter much w/r/t Iran, imo. Giving hardliners in Iran extra rhetorical basis for Anti-Americanism, even in the short-term, is not something I support.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



I don’t understand your statement … on multiple levels but I'll limit my responses to the Honduran military-backed coup comments.



That may be because you did not quote my entire statement:
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I know it's not convenient for you to acknowledge that US involvement in the internal affairs of Honduras, in contrast to lack of involvement in Iran. It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



In my reply to Bill, I am stating that the US has already displayed the double standard by not standing with the Iranian people, perhaps our most natural cultural ally in Asia, in the face of corruption, rigged elections, oppressive theocratical despots, yet by standing behind a guy who was overtly in breach of the constitution, overtly being supported by a non-US-friendly Venezuelan regime, and ruled against by that nation's Supreme Court (as well as Congress).

That is the dichotomy.

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*If* the US had supported the military-backed & executed deposing of a democratically-elected leader during his lawful term without any trial that *would* have been a double standard or “dichotomy.” If we would have turned a metaphorical ‘blind eye’ to the actions of an ally, that would enable criticism of having different standards for our friends than our non-friends.



It's not like we have not taken sides before. The policy coming out of the administration is soft, non-committal, to anyone, or anything.

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Forcefully removing a democratically-elected leader -- while still in his jammies – and exiling him, during his elected term, to a foreign state is counter to the rule of law.



Whose law? What little you and I know about Honduran law (I'll admit I'm certainly no expert), and what I've been able to find written in english, Zelaya was attempting to amend the Honduran Constitution on a point that cannot be amended, and even if it could, only the Congress can do it, if voted on, twice. The Wall Street Journal radio program had a report that Zelaya is lucky to still have his citizenship.

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If you want to argue that the US should depose someone based on politics,



I've made no such argument, and challenge you to show where I did.
So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

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Right now there is a huge grass roots movement to intervene in Sudan. Is it our business? That is debateable. Based on our track record of waltzing around the world as democracy police, then yes. Does it expand our interests? Not really. Does it eat at our conscience knowing we could probably fix it? Of course.



If I understood, you’ve expanded to a third potential category (that Bacevich didn’t even address). One might imagine a spectrum with clear wars of necessity (when an invader is attempting to conquer/take territory physically) at one end. Are “wars of conscience” a subset of “wars of choice” or would they be located btw “wars of necessity” “wars of choice” on a spectrum?

I think it does go back to some of what Bacevich suggests w/r/t the importance of having principles that guide those choices. Whatever the principle might be: non-intervention or moral/ethical drivers or something else.

/Marg … p.s. “poli-sci 2xx?” is further along in a social science curriculum than I ever got; I was over in the chem & physics labs. B|


sorry, im a bit late getting back to this thread. i suppose wars of conscience could or should be a subdivision of wars of choice. I think what actually happens is that a 'war of choice' is immediately or eventually played to the american people as a war of conscience to get us on board.

Iraq as an example, who knows bush's real reason for going in there, really only he and cheney do. we can speculate all we want. initially the american people didnt give a shit who we bombed as long as they looked like a muslim extremist we were happy. what started as a war of necessity eventually evolved into 'we're helping oust a dictator and installing a functioning democracy because these people would suffer without our help.'

so yeah technically a war of conscience could fall as a subcategory of war of choice, however the reality (in my mind) is that it depends on who is in office to decide what to label the reason we go and screw a country up and risk our boys lives. conscience will always be in there somewhere- especially with what they sell our troops.

vietnam is a good example, in the beginning, of what our tropps were told. My dad having been an army ranger over there in '65 and '66 has all sorts of interesting takes on the war now that so much time has passed: as a green soldier, a tested soldier, and now long time veteran. he can recall his emotions as he flew on a plane over there reading the little pamphlet the government gave him on why his service in vietnam was patriotic and needed by the vietnamese people. he can recall how he felt he was betraying his vietnamese friends 13 months later when he left and how the war shifted from a job as a soldier to a personal battle for the interests of those he served next to. And now at 67 years old he is much wiser, more educated, and has witnessed the government get its hands dirty in all sorts of odd places.

The reason we got involved? some politicians somewhere 12,000 miles away thought it was 'politically interesting.' They sexed it up and packaged it to play our conscience, which ultimately became a valid reason to be there until the costs were too heavy- was it the real motive? who knows.

So ultimately i think wars of choice and wars of conscience are tied so intimately together in most cases that it just depends on who is looking at it and from what angle. What can be universally agreed on is due to the information age we live in, we are in an era of war we haven't seen before when it comes to motive. that's not to say 'old wars' have disappeared, we just have war version 3.0 out now.
So there I was...

Making friends and playing nice since 1983

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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



I don’t understand your statement … on multiple levels but I'll limit my responses to the Honduran military-backed coup comments.



That may be because you did not quote my entire statement:
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I know it's not convenient for you to acknowledge that US involvement in the internal affairs of Honduras, in contrast to lack of involvement in Iran. It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



I apologize if you mistook my lack of complete quotation in the intent of something other than concision. I also didn’t think that the ad hominem toward Bill was worth replicating. I consider Bill’s argument (and mine) to be more than just “convenience.”



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In my reply to Bill, I am stating that the US has already displayed the double standard by not standing with the Iranian people, perhaps our most natural cultural ally in Asia, in the face of corruption, rigged elections, oppressive theocratical despots, yet by standing behind a guy who was overtly in breach of the constitution, overtly being supported by a non-US-friendly Venezuelan regime, and ruled against by that nation's Supreme Court (as well as Congress).

That is the dichotomy.



Again this is what I don't understand the comparing two different things to create a dichotomy that doesn’t exist. Bill (I’m pretty confident in asserting and even moreso that he'll tell me if he feels otherwise), you and me all don’t support the current Iranian regime or it’s actions.

If the US was insisting that Mr. Zelaya’s alleged (you do recognize that they are allegations, yes?) actions in violation of the Honduran constitution be ignored or disregarded that would be a double standard. I.e., it’s okay if our ally does it, but not if Iran does it. If Mr. Zelaya altered the Constitution as he is has been alleged to intend to do so, and the US supported that, that would also be a double standard. But the US hasn’t done that.

The US supports the return of the democratically-elected leader of an ally during his legal term to his nation-state.

Exiling a democratically-elected leader during his legal term at gunpoint to a foreign state is outside of rule of law. Objecting to that is rhetoric that justifies us arguing that Iran should also follow the rule of law. Not the other way around.



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Forcefully removing a democratically-elected leader -- while still in his jammies – and exiling him, during his elected term, to a foreign state is counter to the rule of law.



Whose law? What little you and I know about Honduran law (I'll admit I'm certainly no expert), and what I've been able to find written in english, Zelaya was attempting to amend the Honduran Constitution on a point that cannot be amended, and even if it could, only the Congress can do it, if voted on, twice. The Wall Street Journal radio program had a report that Zelaya is lucky to still have his citizenship.



Again, as I'm reading it, there's a mixing of the alleged violations by Mr. Zelaya with the deposing and exile of a democratically-elected leader without any proceedings. That is to what the US and rest of OAS is objecting. I don’t know how else to write it more clearly.

Article 239 Honduran Constitution is what Mr. Zelaya is alleged to have tried to violate. My translation (as always feel free to do your own translation or find another source):
Article 239 - The citizen who has already held the position of head of the executive branch may not be President or Designee again. Anyone who violates this provision or changes it, as well as those who directly or indirectly support violation, will immediately cease the discharge of their duties, and will be unable to hold any public office for a period of 10 years.
There's nothing about exile. The main issue is that the Supreme Court and military lacked the authority to do what they did. It would be sort of like the Supreme Court removing a US president because of allegations that laws were broken. No due process.

The failure is a lack of an adequate impeachment process. Process matters.

What there is, in article 241 is requirement that the President of the Republic shall not leave the country for more than fifteen days without the permission of Congress or its Standing Committee. Under Article 242, if the President does is out of the country for more than 15 days, the Constitution does state that the National Congress shall exercise the executive power for the remainder to complete the constitutional period.

There’s where the exile comes in. He’s out of the country and thereby, under rule of law, can be legally removed. (Was that the intent of Constitution is a whole 'nother issue?)

Was Mr. Zelaya acting counter to the intent of the Honduran Constitution? Perhaps, he was. I’m inclined to suspect he was. Does that mean rule of law should be ignored? No.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



How do you assert as “proof” something will not work if it hasn’t been done? (It’s also not a good argument for “proof” that it will work either.) It might be an argument for or against something, but how is it “proof”? A priori assertion of proof would seem to necessitate a very high standard of evidence. What is the evidence?

I think of proof of a policy’s effectiveness or lack thereof based on the outcome of policy (& how well it accomplishes or doesn’t the policy goals, e.g., strategic principles). How is an contested, asserted dichotomy “proof” something will not work?

How are what Prof Bacevich outlines "soft" or "easy"? Imo, what he is suggesting are very hard/not easy issues with which to deal: homeland defense, bridging the exacerbating civil-military divide, controlled spending/budgeting, and lack of grand strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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...on par with soldiers from the US Army breaking into the White House in early 1974, forcing Pres Nixon at gunpoint onto a plane, and dropping him off in Canada without an impeachment hearing....



Nixon had tried to run a referendum to grant himself a third term? And it had been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? And then he'd tried to remove the chief justice from office by force? And Congress had voted to remove Nixon and replace him?

Wow, I knew Nixon had done some pretty bad stuff, but the history books don't appear to come even close to explaining how bad.
-- Tom Aiello

Tom@SnakeRiverBASE.com
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...on par with soldiers from the US Army breaking into the White House in early 1974, forcing Pres Nixon at gunpoint onto a plane, and dropping him off in Canada without an impeachment hearing....



Nixon had tried to run a referendum to grant himself a third term? And it had been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? And then he'd tried to remove the chief justice from office by force? And Congress had voted to remove Nixon and replace him?

Wow, I knew Nixon had done some pretty bad stuff, but the history books don't appear to come even close to explaining how bad.



No. Of course not.

Pres Nixon, however, like Mr Zelaya was accused of violating the law and it appeared to a whole lot of people that he was pretty guilty.

Unlike the case of Mr. Zelaya in Hondurus, impeachment hearings were held in Congressional Judiciary Committees in line with due process of law, he elected to resign, and he was not exiled by the military in his jammies.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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Most important difference: the rule of law was followed in one case (US) and not in the other.



Definitely. But the rule of law was followed by neither side in Honduras.

If we're landing on a side (and I don't think we ought to) then I'd go for the guys who violated the rule of law last, and in response, rather than the guy who did it first, in an effort to extend his own power.
-- Tom Aiello

Tom@SnakeRiverBASE.com
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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



How do you assert as “proof” something will not work if it hasn’t been done? (It’s also not a good argument for “proof” that it will work either.) It might be an argument for or against something, but how is it “proof”? A priori assertion of proof would seem to necessitate a very high standard of evidence. What is the evidence?

I think of proof of a policy’s effectiveness or lack thereof based on the outcome of policy (& how well it accomplishes or doesn’t the policy goals, e.g., strategic principles). How is an contested, asserted dichotomy “proof” something will not work?

How are what Prof Bacevich outlines "soft" or "easy"? Imo, what he is suggesting are very hard/not easy issues with which to deal: homeland defense, bridging the exacerbating civil-military divide, controlled spending/budgeting, and lack of grand strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

/Marg



The Professor's talking points are the "easier, softer way" because they do not confront the issues at hand, I'll address them point by point:

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“First, the Long War may be long, but it should not get any bigger. The regime-change approach -- invade and occupy to transform – hasn’t worked; simply trying harder in some other venue (Somalia? Sudan?) won’t produce different results. In short, no more Iraqs.



Actually, it did work. However it didn't work as quickly, or a cleanly as some promised it would (i.e. the greetings with flowers, etc). The error was in the execution of strategy and the resistance to change that strategy. Hind sight of course tells us that General Shinseki was correct in his assessment of needing an occupation force.

Why this argument isn't being applied to Afghanistan, I do not know, but the operation there is already getting bigger, and the hornets nest getting stirred up is proof that it is making an impact.

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“Second, forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.



Iran and Pakistan are very real possibilities. The argument can be made that we are already engaged in Pakistan, and any expansion on those fronts will most certainly by "preventative" in nature. In fact, this is contrary to President Clinton's involvement in the Balkans. It certainly doesn't bode well for future problems that may arise with The Sudan, Rwanda, where the US most certainly should have taken a role to prevent such massive genocide.

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“Third, no more crusades unless the American people buy in; expecting a relative handful of soldiers to carry the load while the rest of the country binges on consumption is unconscionable. At a minimum, the generation that opts for war should pay for it through higher taxes rather than foisting a burden of debt onto their grandchildren.



I agree with this, and this was one of President Bush's major errors at the onset. He should have led the American people to be better in step with a longer, harder campaign - buying bonds, saving fuel, etc.

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“Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a ‘mighty fortress is our God’; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.



It is still up for debate, but still generally accepted that Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick did not facilitate easy communication between CIA and FBI. http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110004956

Current AG Holder (then DAG) was aware of problems as well: http://www.911familiesforamerica.org/?p=1141

So, I submit that without that encroachment, 9/11 might have been prevented.

In addition, the fact that there has not been an attack on the continental US since then, our agencies are doing something right. So, the Professor's point is really an assessment of Monday-morning-quarterbacking. The projection of US force has, in fact worked numerous times over the years, quite effectively.

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“Fifth, by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy. Yet we’re more likely to enjoy success by modeling freedom rather than trying to impose it. To provide a suitable model, we’ve considerable work to do here at home.



Our successes and failures during the Cold War do not make this a guarantee. I will agree with you that there has been a notable void in "grand strategy" since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To his point, the notion of "promotion through attraction" only goes so far, tangible and intangible barriers must be removed to make that happen. Libya is a good example, as is the ongoing peace between Egypt and Israel - both the result of direct and indirect action by the US (in fact, the US still "helps" keep the peace between Israel and Egypt).

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“Now, some may view these principles as inadequate. Fair enough: Come up with something better. The point is that unless we get the fundamentals right -- and we haven’t since the Cold War ended -- the United States may yet share the fate suffered by Churchill’s Britain, reduced from engine to caboose in the course of his own political career. Those are the consequences of strategic drift.



The issue I have this dismissive statement is that there was a static position that made all other considerations secondary during the Cold War. Everything was channeled through the lens of contending with the Soviet position at the time. We are unable to do that today. The power structure is not balanced now, and instead of the US dealing with one big bear in the room, we are faced with dealing with several hyenas, hundreds of vultures (and one big Panda too).

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“Obama has appointed czars for a host of issues, his administration today employing more czars than have occupied the Kremlin throughout its history. Yet there is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.”



...and this is the lynch pin for me. The Professor's points do invoke thought, but this final statement proves to me that he is writing for the sake of writing (and this guy has been busy since the 1970s, his credit sheet is 14 pages long) and somehow, has overlooked the plainly obvious that the President is the "strategy czar", and has a host of advisors and department heads to shape and execute that policy, including SecDef, SecState, NSA, NID, DCI, VP, Joint Chiefs...I'd like the Professor to explain what a "strategy czar" would do that the current command structure can't?

The Professor misses the clarity of the Cold War (and compared to today, it's understandable).

He asked the questions about what is viable, and it most certainly is. The US presence isolates Iran, positions us to deal with Pakistan, and keeps a subtle pressure on Russia through our presence in some of the former Soviet territories. Without us there, we will see unchecked development of programs and terror networks that will attack the US again, incite Israel and send the region into a sh*t-storm that would make our 2003 invasion look like a back-yard barbecue.

Therefore, his ideas, are polite, and "nice" and "enlightened", but not rooted in the reality we have now.
So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

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Thanks for the more detailed replies.

Where we started:

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It is this dichotomy in policy that will affect critical issues like Afghanistan and Iraq and proof that this professor's soft/easy talking points will not work.



How do you assert as “proof” something will not work if it hasn’t been done? (It’s also not a good argument for “proof” that it will work either.) It might be an argument for or against something, but how is it “proof”? A priori assertion of proof would seem to necessitate a very high standard of evidence. What is the evidence?

I think of proof of a policy’s effectiveness or lack thereof based on the outcome of policy (& how well it accomplishes or doesn’t the policy goals, e.g., strategic principles). How is an contested, asserted dichotomy “proof” something will not work?



I'm still not seeing "proof." Counter-arguments, sure. Maybe "proof" means different things to us.



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The error was in the execution of strategy and the resistance to change that strategy. Hind sight of course tells us that General Shinseki was correct in his assessment of needing an occupation force.



You’re starting to sound like what I’ve been writing. :)


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Why this argument isn't being applied to Afghanistan, I do not know, but the operation there is already getting bigger, and the hornets nest getting stirred up is proof that it is making an impact.



Actually it has been. Notably in this context, by Prof Bacevich. Remember, I wrote Bacevich is a leading critic of counterinsurgency theory, not in any small part based on traditional Republican arguments of non-interventionism. A number of folks have asserted that resistance to change was the main factor in GEN McKiernan’s replacement by GEN McChrystal.

Again, the use of the word “proof.” Making an impact does not necessarily equal something that is in the long term interest of US goals in Afghanistan, in the region (regional stability), or against the radical global Salafist movement . Are those tactical impacts or strategic impacts? What kind of measureable metrics are “hornets nest getting stirred up”? How do you propose to count that or to assess its short- and long-term effect? If “hornets nest getting stirred up” radicalizes more Afghanis and Pakistanis to align with the "irreconcilable" Taliban or al Qa’eda, that’s not a measure of success. If “hornets nest getting stirred up” correlates to removing by detaining or killing the "irreconcilables," (a euphemism that is popular; I prefer more something precise, e.g., core Al Qa'eda and explicit, militant Taliban) then that may be a measure of tactical success in support of a larger strategy. What have been the metrics that the new commander in Afghanistan has spoken about w/r/t Afghanistan?



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I submit that without that encroachment, 9/11 might have been prevented.



Might have … might not have. There certainly was much that could have been done, as the 9-11 Commission detailed, *especially* if more folks had been listening to folks like Prof. Bacevich, Prof Bruce Hoffman, etc.



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“Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a ‘mighty fortress is our God’; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.



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In addition, the fact that there has not been an attack on the continental US since then, our agencies are doing something right. So, the Professor's point is really an assessment of Monday-morning-quarterbacking. The projection of US force has, in fact worked numerous times over the years, quite effectively.



So a metric for “proof” of success of strategy is amount of time between attacks on the Continental US, yes?

It’s been almost 8 years since the attack of September 2001.

There were 8.5 years between the first attack on WTC Center (February 1993) and September 2001. By the metric you proposed for "proof" – amount of time between attacks on Continental US – does that prove that the policies of the Clinton administration were as or slightly more successful? I really don’t think that's what you want to argue.

Another illustrative example of why that kind of metric is difficult to use as "proof." There has never been a war between nuclear weapons states. Some folks, the “nuclear optimists,” argue that shows that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force internationally because of the almost 60 years (dating from Aug 1949 when the Soviets tested the atomic bomb not Aug 1945) that has elapsed without a war between nuclear states. 60 > 8. That’s not “proof” of that argument either. (I’m more of a nuclear pessimist myself.)

While I agree our agencies have been doing a whole lot ‘right’ since September 2001, merely citing the lack of domestic attack, without acknowledging the previous interim time period is problematic.

So that’s not really proof, eh? It’s supposition. One might say hopeful supposition. It’s a supposition which I hope is true.

“Monday-morning quarterbacking” or acknowledgement of need for lessons learned and emphasis on homeland security and homeland defense? If a conservative Catholic COL Bacevich had written the Op-Ed and someone else had posted it, might you possibly read his words as criticizing the Clinton administration’s lack of preparedness? The Op-ed is titled “Obama’s Strategic Blind Spot” – that’s a criticism.

Prof Bacevich’s critiques are not that different in policy recommendations than Ralph Peters, LTC USA (ret) which I’ve also posted. (Often disagree w/Peters as well.)



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I will agree with you that there has been a notable void in "grand strategy" since the collapse of the Soviet Union.



[teasing shock]
Max agrees with me :o -- someone better note this for SC history. :P
[/teasing shock]



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To his point, the notion of "promotion through attraction" only goes so far, tangible and intangible barriers must be removed to make that happen. Libya is a good example, as is the ongoing peace between Egypt and Israel - both the result of direct and indirect action by the US (in fact, the US still "helps" keep the peace between Israel and Egypt).



Agree Libya is a great example, which we’ve discussed repeatedly here. Soft power combined with sanctions (the economic side of hard power) and diplomacy gave us what may be the single most successful foreign policy endeavor of the GW Bush administration! Give them credit! A good part of “promotion through attraction” are those intangibles and tangibles of soft power, strategic communications, and diplomacy – all tools of foreign policy.

And why is it important, aka the ”So What? Who cares?” Because it makes executing America’s strategic and foreign policy goals easier and more effective. Easier equals less costly both in $$$ (i.e., American tax dollars) and decreased risk to deployed American service members.

Soft power is also balanced with having the hard power (economic and military) as a counterweight particularly w/r/t deterrence.



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… somehow, has overlooked the plainly obvious that the President is the "strategy czar", and has a host of advisors and department heads to shape and execute that policy, including SecDef, SecState, NSA, NID, DCI, VP, Joint Chiefs...I'd like the Professor to explain what a "strategy czar" would do that the current command structure can't?



Since President Truman, the “strategy czar” has been the National Security Advisor (NSA). I strongly suspect Prof Bacevich is not suggesting another “czar” be appointed but is instead highlighting the lack of emphasis on and apparent interest in grand strategy since the end of the Cold War that thus far the Obama administration seems to be replicating. Especially in context of all sorts of other “czars” being appointed.

While you and I may not agree with all his recommendations, his critique is perhaps too entirely rooted in the reality of the now, the last 8 years, and the last 40 years, viscerally so. It might not be everyone’s reality and I may disagree with many of his conclusions, but it’s reality.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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Thanks for the reply.

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I think what actually happens is that a 'war of choice' is immediately or eventually played to the american people as a war of conscience to get us on board.

Iraq as an example, who knows bush's real reason for going in there, really only he and cheney do. we can speculate all we want. initially the american people didnt give a shit who we bombed as long as they looked like a muslim extremist we were happy. what started as a war of necessity eventually evolved into 'we're helping oust a dictator and installing a functioning democracy because these people would suffer without our help.'

so yeah technically a war of conscience could fall as a subcategory of war of choice, however the reality (in my mind) is that it depends on who is in office to decide what to label the reason we go and screw a country up and risk our boys lives. conscience will always be in there somewhere- especially with what they sell our troops.



The reason we got involved? some politicians somewhere 12,000 miles away thought it was 'politically interesting.' They sexed it up and packaged it to play our conscience, which ultimately became a valid reason to be there until the costs were too heavy- was it the real motive? who knows.



War is politics by other means, eh?

In addition to looking to Vietnam, one can also look back to WWII. With 60 years of hindsight and history, one can look back and is hard-pressed to offer a stronger case for entering into a “war of conscience” both w/r/t the Holocaust in Europe and the actions of the Japanese in China, e.g., 1937 “Rape of Nanking.” Until Pearl Harbor was attacked, there was significant and substantial popular resistance to the US giving up neutrality. In addition, official US law required neutrality, i.e., the “neutrality acts.” As late as March 1941, efforts such as the Lend-Lease Act were hugely controversial. Pres Roosevelt took tremendous risks in advocating for that policy.




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So ultimately i think wars of choice and wars of conscience are tied so intimately together in most cases that it just depends on who is looking at it and from what angle.



Concur to some extent. The caveat being not all “wars of choice” are necessarily “wars of conscience.”

Wars over resources are another category. One perspective might see them as “wars of necessity,” while the other as “wars on choice.” While we most often hear about the Kashmiri conflict in terms of ethnic or religious tensions and territorial dispute from the break-up of the British Empire, there are also underlying resource issues. The Kashmir area is the watershed for much of India. Water as a resource.



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What can be universally agreed on is due to the information age we live in, we are in an era of war we haven't seen before when it comes to motive. that's not to say 'old wars' have disappeared, we just have war version 3.0 out now.



There’s a school of thought out there that is playing with the idea that what we in the west have largely come to think of as the character of ‘old wars’ – uniformed military of one state against the uniformed military of another state on a defined battlefield – are gone or were a product of 400 or so years of a international system that predominated in Europe (the Westphalian system). That what is the more common way of doing war, even over the last 400 years, didn’t look like that and won’t again in the future.

If that idea is true, that does have the potential to be a strategic blindspot, imo.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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Another illustrative example of why that kind of metric is difficult to use as "proof." There has never been a war between nuclear weapons states. Some folks, the “nuclear optimists,” argue that shows that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force internationally because of the almost 60 years (dating from Aug 1949 when the Soviets tested the atomic bomb not Aug 1945) that has elapsed without a war between nuclear states. 60 > 8. That’s not “proof” of that argument either. (I’m more of a nuclear pessimist myself.)



Sounds like a separate thread. But are the sides so black and white?

I think simply stating nukes has been a stabling force
is support by the 60 years without global wars. I don't think the premise dies if there is an exception. In the history up to WW2, these wars were on a generational cycle - every 20-30 years. The counterargument would be that we finally learned after have a really really total world war, but I'm less optimistic about our ability to learn.

The article you cite - I suspect it argues that no amount of poliferation changes this, which is a much harder proof. I think human error is always a factor and as N increases, so does that risk.

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At the core, yes.

Nuclear pessimists don’t necessarily see nuclear weapons as destabilizing to international community. Nuclear pessimists, rather, consider the risks that nuclear weapons bring, specifically the potential for nuclear accidents (including but not limited to human error) and limits of organizational structures of potential proliferant states, to outweigh the rational actor models that drive the nuclear optimists view. Nuclear pessimists find other explanations, such as institutions, strategic culture, economics, in addition to deterrence, for the last 60 years of stability that extend beyond neorealist explanations.

Given former Secretary of Defense McNamara’s death last week, in the context of the nuclear optimist/pessimist debate, it’s worth recalling, imo, how close we got – and most, who were alive, didn’t realize at the time – to nuclear war.

If you’re interested in the nuclear optimist/pessimist debate, the leading work is Ken Waltz (UC Berkeley emeritus) and Scott Sagan’s (Stanford) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

/Marg

Act as if everything you do matters, while laughing at yourself for thinking anything you do matters.
Tibetan Buddhist saying

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