28 years since Challenger

[grue 1]

cavete terrae.

[shropshire 0]

wow where have the years gone.....

Still at least we had them to do with as we please.

(.)Y(.)
Chivalry is not dead; it only sleeps for want of work to do. - Jerome K Jerome

[davjohns 1]

Came home from college courses. My mom was on the phone. I hit the door and my mom pointed at the television in the livingroom. I just sat down in my dad's chair and stared at the TV.

I know it just wouldnt be right to kill all the stupid people that we meet..

But do you think it would be appropriate to just remove all of the warning labels and let nature take its course.

[RonD1120 62]

One of those days I will never forget. Working in Tampa FL, I looked out my East office window and viewed that distinctive smoke trail.

Look for the shiny things of God revealed by the Holy Spirit. They only last for an instant but it is a Holy Instant. Let your soul absorb them.

[FlyingRhenquest 1]

grue

I'd rather approach it not from a standpoint of dwelling on the tragedy but rather reflecting on the bravery of the guys who strap themselves into several tons of explosives to shoot themselves into space on a regular basis despite the risks. And it IS a risky endeavor, every time you go up. Space and the hardware for getting you there is not forgiving. Every astronaut knows each launch could be his last, they do it anyway.

I think the Challenger incident was when most of America really started losing its taste for space exploration. Sure we had some problems in the 60's when we were trying to get to the Moon, but the Space Shuttle looked like a commercial airline and had been functioning pretty well. We'd thought we'd conquered space and going there was routine, then that happened.

Back then most kids seemed to want to grow up to be a fireman or an astronaut. Now it seems like "astronaut" is off the table. As much as I didn't like the shuttle (expensive pork-laden boondoggle) at least we had our launch capability for manned missions. Being stuck at the bottom of the gravity well really doesn't have to be an insurmountable problem.

I'm trying to teach myself how to set things on fire with my mind. Hey... is it hot in here?

[Anvilbrother 0]

I view it as a tragedy that occurred due to someone not wanting to spend money on an escape system, and a trigger happy NASA admin that did not head the warnings, of those that built the shuttle, and chose to launch outside temperature parameters that components were never expected to work in.

They survived the break up of the vehicle inside the crew compartment, and died when they hit the water. It took loosing 2 shuttles before they finally put in the escape pole. Even in the initial tests they had the modified sr-71 ejection seats installed.

Postes r made from an iPad or iPhone. Spelling and gramhair mistakes guaranteed move along,

[wmw999 2,457]

The escape pole was an extremely risky low-probability item. And yes, there was pressure to launch, and that was unacceptable. The same kind of schedule-itis helped lead to Columbia as well.

Of course, when an industry is required to do everything perfectly, and perfectly efficiently (remember, it's gummint contractors, always subject to audits), there can be schedule pressure ("another DELAY??? What wimps!") . Not a perfect system, but somehow the gummint having a fatality is worse than a private contractor under similar circumstances. Unless we're talking about soldiers, of course

Wendy P.

There is nothing more dangerous than breaking a basic safety rule and getting away with it. It removes fear of the consequences and builds false confidence. (tbrown)

[jakee 1,500]

Quote

Of course, when an industry is required to do everything perfectly, and perfectly efficiently (remember, it's gummint contractors, always subject to audits), there can be schedule pressure ("another DELAY??? What wimps!")

From the outside, and reading through things like the Feynman enquiry it seems like a textbook case of what happens when management's wishes and fairy dust are given more weight and importance than cold engineering reality

Do you want to have an ideagasm?

[xsniper 1]

***One of those days I will never forget. Working in Tampa FL, I looked out my East office window and viewed that distinctive smoke trail.[/quote

So much the same. Working in Lakeland, listening to launch on radio. Saw explosion but just didn't want to believe it. The smoke trail lingered in the air for a very very long time.

[RonD1120 62]

Don't I know you from Skydive Tampa in Mulberry? Weren't you with LPD?

Look for the shiny things of God revealed by the Holy Spirit. They only last for an instant but it is a Holy Instant. Let your soul absorb them.

[kallend 2,027]

jakee

Quote

Of course, when an industry is required to do everything perfectly, and perfectly efficiently (remember, it's gummint contractors, always subject to audits), there can be schedule pressure ("another DELAY??? What wimps!")

From the outside, and reading through things like the Feynman enquiry it seems like a textbook case of what happens when management's wishes and fairy dust are given more weight and importance than cold engineering reality

ABSO-BLOODY-LUTELY.

Ditto for the Pinto gas tank explosions.

(I blame the proliferation of MBA programs)

...

The only sure way to survive a canopy collision is not to have one.

[wayneflorida 0]

Can't believe it has been 47 years since the Apollo 1 fire.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1

[Channman 2]

WOW...it's been that long ago. I was working with that crew way back in the days of the Weightless Environment Training Facilities in Building 29. Remember the day President Regan came to NASA for the Memorial services and a Piper Cub flew over rocking his wings left and right just as a Secret Service Black Hawk flew up to meet him over the assembled crowd and escorted the pilot to Ellington Field where he was detained.

Back in those days they wore a flight suit with a helmet that provided emergency O2 with only 3 crewmember activating their O2 bottles. All of them more than likely suffered Air Embolisms but did not survive the water impact. After the accident they began wearing the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) as we called it. This suit was later worn by future crewmembers including the crew of Columbus, but was not designed to withstand the tragic breakup.

[grue 1]

FlyingRhenquest

Back then most kids seemed to want to grow up to be a fireman or an astronaut. Now it seems like "astronaut" is off the table.

It's all I wanted to do, personally. My life plan was pilot -> test pilot -> NASA. Family was very supportive, sent me to space camp, made sure I studied my math and science, even made the political connections to help get me a nomination to USAFA. Then when I was 16 I failed the vision test to get my license and found out I needed glasses.

I'd never really considered the idea that I wouldn't succeed, so finding out that I couldn't reach my goal through no fault of my own was pretty crushing. Everything went downhill from there…

cavete terrae.

[wmw999 2,457]

Oh, it was. As was Columbia.

Remember that the people who get ahead are the ones who make their supervisors look good. And the easiest way to make your supervisor look good is to make it possible for him to tell his manager what he wants to hear

Wendy P.

There is nothing more dangerous than breaking a basic safety rule and getting away with it. It removes fear of the consequences and builds false confidence. (tbrown)

[grue 1]

wmw999

Oh, it was. As was Columbia.

Remember that the people who get ahead are the ones who make their supervisors look good. And the easiest way to make your supervisor look good is to make it possible for him to tell his manager what he wants to hear

Wendy P.

But I thought groupthink is good because it's working together!

cavete terrae.

[Elisha 1]

I was in 5th grade. The buildings in my elementary school some type of hexagon or other polygon in shape, I think divided into 3 classrooms, but the dividing "walls" slid open. My class and another teacher's were kinda like tandem teachers - did a lot of joint activities together.

Anyway, the doors were opened and both open that day and we gathered around the TV. We oohd and ahhd and then watched the Challenger launch. As it was coming apart, I was thinking, "This looks bad." Then, both teachers started crying. More understandable for the teachers. I was bummed out and a little sad, but not all shook up like the teachers and other students. I wasn't as emotionally invested to start with.

Anyway, that's my 5th grade perspective. More interesting to later learn about the cut corners that contributed to the tragedy. May the crew's memory be eternal.

[Elisha 1]

grue

***
Back then most kids seemed to want to grow up to be a fireman or an astronaut. Now it seems like "astronaut" is off the table.

It's all I wanted to do, personally. My life plan was pilot -> test pilot -> NASA. Family was very supportive, sent me to space camp, made sure I studied my math and science, even made the political connections to help get me a nomination to USAFA. Then when I was 16 I failed the vision test to get my license and found out I needed glasses.

I'd never really considered the idea that I wouldn't succeed, so finding out that I couldn't reach my goal through no fault of my own was pretty crushing. Everything went downhill from there…

Ahhhh, poor little grue. Here's a hug. O :)

[billvon 3,006]

>I view it as a tragedy that occurred due to someone not wanting to spend money on an escape system

I don't see that as the tragedy. Neither the initial nor the later pole-based escape system would have helped most of that crew. (The survivability report detailed how their necks and backs were broken from the G-forces.)

This accident might have been prevented had they heeded the pre-launch temperature warnings, and the later Columbia accident might have been prevented had they heeded the warnings on the fragility of the tiles. But had they heeded _all_ the warnings, and dealt with all the potential problems before the first launch, they would never have launched to begin with. Spaceflight is inherently risky, and no amount of work will prevent all possible fatal incidents. At best you can learn from previous incidents and apply that knowledge going forward, so that your odds of having a recurrence of _that_ incident go down.

[grue 1]

yay hugs!

cavete terrae.

[Anvilbrother 0]

Quote

I don't see that as the tragedy. Neither the initial nor the later pole-based escape system would have helped most of that crew. (The survivability report detailed how their necks and backs were broken from the G-forces.)

Where are you getting that from? Everything I have read said they probably survived the break up. They even activated almost all their PEAP emergency breathing supplies which Kerwin said because of the design of the activation switch, it was highly unlikely the PEAPs were turned on by impact.

On July 28, six months to the day after the disaster, NASA staged a news conference in Washington to discuss the investigation. Kerwin said the cause and time of death remained unknown.

"The findings are inconclusive," he wrote in a letter to Truly. "The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the explosion was masked. Our final conclusions are:



The cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined;
The forces to which the crew were exposed during orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and
The crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure."

Accelerometers, instruments that measure the magnitude and direction of forces acting on the shuttle during flight, lost power when the nose section ripped away two tenths of a second after structural break up began. Independent analysis of all recovered data and wreckage concluded the nose pitched down as soon as it broke away and then slowed rapidly from aerodynamic forces. Calculations and analysis of launch photography indicate the acceleration forces the astronauts felt were between 12 and 20 times the force of gravity in a vertical direction, that is, as the cabin broke away, the astronauts were violently pushed down in their seats.

"These accelerations were quite brief," Kerwin wrote. "In two seconds, they were below four G's; in less than 10 seconds, the crew compartment was essentially in free fall. Medical analysis indicates that these accelerations are survivable, and that the probability of major injury to crew members is low."

When Challenger broke up, it was traveling at 1.9 times the speed of sound at an altitude of 48,000 feet. The crew module continued flying upward for some 25 seconds to an altitude of about 65,000 feet before beginning the long fall to the ocean. From breakup to impact took two minutes and 45 seconds. Impact velocity was 207 mph, subjecting the module to a braking force of approximately 200 times the force of gravity. Any astronauts still alive at that moment were killed instantly.

When the cabin ripped away from the fuselage, the crew's oxygen supplies were left behind in the payload bay, "except for a few seconds supply in the lines," Kerwin said. But each astronaut's airtight flight helmet also was connected to a PEAP that contained about six minutes of breathing air. Kerwin said because of the design of the activation switch, it was highly unlikely the PEAPs were turned on by impact. But unlike the oxygen system, the PEAPs did not provide pressurized air and if the cabin lost pressure, they would not have allowed the crew to remain conscious.

"It is possible, but not certain, that the crew lost consciousness due to an in-flight loss of crew module pressure," Kerwin wrote. "Data to support this is:



The accident happened at 48,000 feet and the crew cabin was at that altitude or higher for almost a minute. At that altitude, without an oxygen supply, loss of cabin pressure would have caused rapid loss of consciousness and it would not have been regained before water impact.
PEAP activation could have been an instinctive response to unexpected loss of cabin pressure.
If a leak developed in the crew compartment as a result of structural damage during or after breakup (even if the PEAPs had been activated), the breathing air available would not have prevented rapid loss of consciousness.
The crew seats and restraint harnesses showed patterns of failure which demonstrates that all the seats were in place and occupied at water impact with all harnesses locked. This would likely be the case had rapid loss of consciousness occurred, but it does not constitute proof."

Despite NASA's best efforts, engineers were never able to determine if cabin pressure was lost. Astronaut Crippen said later he was convinced it did, however, because had the cabin maintained pressure there would have been no need to activate the PEAPs. He said in his view, the astronauts made a "desperate" attempt to survive by activating the PEAPs when pressure was suddenly lost.

Of the four PEAPs recovered, the one that belonged to Scobee had not been activated. Of the other three, one was identified as Smith's and because of the location of the activation switch on the back of his seat, Truly said he believed Resnik or Onizuka turned the pilot's emergency air supply on in a heroic bid to save his life. The exact sequence of events will never be known.

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[billvon 3,006]

>Where are you getting that from?

I was talking about the Columbia there; sorry if that was confusing.

From the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report:

"After the crew lost consciousness due to the loss of cabin pressure, the seat inertial reel mechanisms on the crews’ shoulder harnesses did not lock. As a result, the unconscious or deceased crew was exposed to cyclical rotational motion while restrained only at the lower body. Crew helmets do not conform to the head. Consequently, lethal trauma occurred to the unconscious or deceased crew due to the lack of upper body support and restraint."

However, in both cases, an "escape pole" would not have helped - and at best the ejection seats would have saved the commander and pilot.

[Anvilbrother 0]

Quote

However, in both cases, an "escape pole" would not have helped - and at best the ejection seats would have saved the commander and pilot

No the escape pole also came with the Advanced Crew Escape suit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Crew_Escape_Suit

The challenger crew would have been able to be pressurized with the suit, and bail out with the pole

Even NASA agrees

Quote

Any one of these systems might have saved the Challenger crew, says Kevin Templin, a project manager in the shuttle engineering office. Challenger's crew module separated intact and went into a 2½-minute free fall from 50,000 feet.

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[DanG 1]

Quote

But had they heeded _all_ the warnings, and dealt with all the potential problems before the first launch, they would never have launched to begin with. Spaceflight is inherently risky, and no amount of work will prevent all possible fatal incidents.

You say that as if Challenger blew up on the first SRS mission. The point of the Challenger accident is that the program managers ignored the operating limitations of the vehicle, and the pointed warnings of cognizant engineers.

Quote

At best you can learn from previous incidents and apply that knowledge going forward, so that your odds of having a recurrence of _that_ incident go down.

Exactly, and there already was previous knowledge about the o-rings' temperature sensitivity. The Challenger blew up because certain people chose not to apply existing knowledge and reduce the odds of a specific, known failure mode.

- Dan G

[FlyingRhenquest 1]

wmw999

The escape pole was an extremely risky low-probability item. And yes, there was pressure to launch, and that was unacceptable. The same kind of schedule-itis helped lead to Columbia as well.

Of course, when an industry is required to do everything perfectly, and perfectly efficiently (remember, it's gummint contractors, always subject to audits), there can be schedule pressure ("another DELAY??? What wimps!") . Not a perfect system, but somehow the gummint having a fatality is worse than a private contractor under similar circumstances. Unless we're talking about soldiers, of course

Wendy P.

Seems like this could be solved quite handily by shooting the guys complaining about the delays into space. Maybe they'd be a bit more keen to make sure everything is correct, then...

I'm trying to teach myself how to set things on fire with my mind. Hey... is it hot in here?