A tale of three pilots

[billvon 3,050]

I was struck by this sentence in one of Winsor's post - "When working with lethal service, nobody gets a pass."  And it brought to mind my experience learning to fly; a 'service' that has been lethal to many.

The first one I thought about was my experience with Stacey.  Stacey was a black woman who was one of my instructors early on.  I didn't like her; she criticized everything I did. I, as a 22 year old guy who had been successful at everything else I had tried, did not think this was fair.

One day while we were practicing cross-country planning we did a short field takeoff, then headed off to a nearby airport.  I retracted the flaps after we took off.  And for some reason, I had to hold a pretty good amount of aileron after that.  It took me a minute but I finally looked back at the flaps.  One had retracted; one had not.  (The aircraft at this FBO left a lot to be desired.)  Stacey didn't say anything about this development.  

"Should I declare an emergency?"

"No!" she said.  "Just give me a minute  . . ."  She seemed to be trying to figure out what to do.

"I'm going to turn back," I said.  She nodded.  I flew back into the ATA and got ready to land.

"OK land but don't touch the flaps!" she said.  OK.  Nevertheless, when turning base I lowered the flaps out of habit; both came down.  We landed safely and pulled back onto the ramp.  As soon as we stopped she went inside.  A minute later she came back out and told me I shouldn't have lowered the flaps; that could have made the problem worse if only one had come down.  I was again annoyed by this since she didn't seem to have many good suggestions during the incident.  What had she been doing inside?  She must have been freaked out, I decided.  I certainly wasn't!

A few years later she was hired by American.  Affirmative action, I thought.  She certainly wasn't a very good pilot!

As I kept flying (and as I started skydiving) I met a few more pilots.  I remember two who were so-so pilots, but in my mind certainly better than Stacey.  One was Harry R, the pilot for Skydive Long Island.  The other was Will, a guy I got to know at Bridge Day in 1992.  Both were competent in my mind but I remember a few things that worried me.  

At SLI we never got to jump due the volume of students and our single 182.  Harry Parker and I decided we'd show up before 8am and make an early morning jump so we could get in the air.  One morning we showed up and Harry R started the plane and began to taxi.  The DZO came out and screamed at him for a good ten minutes - he didn't want anyone to taxi the plane until the oil temperature was in the green.  After he retired to the trailer where he had been sleeping, Harry R was visibly shaken.   Harry Parker told him to take a minute, take a few deep breaths, and calm down.  He looked better after that and we made that early morning jump.

I flew with Will a few times while he was flying Otters.  And he always seemed to be just a minute behind things.  Once when someone started spotting he yelled back "JUST GIVE ME A MINUTE!"  We laughed.  He flew jump aircraft for years before he finally got hired by an air freight company.  No DEI for him!

In 1993 Harry R was flying a load of students when he lost power on takeoff.  He turned downwind to attempt a closed-traffic landing.  On the downwind he was pointed at a 600 acre sod farm just across the road from the DZ.  But he tried to make it back to the runway anyway.  He actually made it back, stalling the aircraft and hitting almost on the centerline.  He died.  The jumpmaster was paralyzed.  The students survived with minor to severe injuries.  Was he anticipating the DZO yelling at him for landing in a sod farm instead of the runway?  Or did he just get fixated?  Or did he misjudge his speed and altitude?  We'll never know - but it cost him his life.

In 2006 Will had moved on to flying freight in small jets.  He was flying a Falcon DA-20 in icing conditions.  On an approach he not only did not turn on the anti-icing system, he let his speed decay to just above stall speed during the approach.  The addition of the ice raised the stall speed a bit.  The plane stalled at a low altitude and crashed; all three crew in the cockpit died.  Again we will never know exactly why.

While I was thinking about this I looked up Stacy.  She had gotten a degree at Embry-Riddle before I flew with her (I never knew that) and afterwards she flew for American Eagle, getting her ATP in the process.  She then switched to UPS and flew 727's, DC-11's and finally 757's and 767's, which she still flies today. 

I have to wonder which pilot Winsor would have preferred flying an aircraft he was on, given that "no one gets a pass."

[JoeWeber 2,790]

37 minutes ago, billvon said:

I was struck by this sentence in one of Winsor's post - "When working with lethal service, nobody gets a pass."  And it brought to mind my experience learning to fly; a 'service' that has been lethal to many.

The first one I thought about was my experience with Stacey.  Stacey was a black woman who was one of my instructors early on.  I didn't like her; she criticized everything I did. I, as a 22 year old guy who had been successful at everything else I had tried, did not think this was fair.

One day while we were practicing cross-country planning we did a short field takeoff, then headed off to a nearby airport.  I retracted the flaps after we took off.  And for some reason, I had to hold a pretty good amount of aileron after that.  It took me a minute but I finally looked back at the flaps.  One had retracted; one had not.  (The aircraft at this FBO left a lot to be desired.)  Stacey didn't say anything about this development.  

"Should I declare an emergency?"

"No!" she said.  "Just give me a minute  . . ."  She seemed to be trying to figure out what to do.

"I'm going to turn back," I said.  She nodded.  I flew back into the ATA and got ready to land.

"OK land but don't touch the flaps!" she said.  OK.  Nevertheless, when turning base I lowered the flaps out of habit; both came down.  We landed safely and pulled back onto the ramp.  As soon as we stopped she went inside.  A minute later she came back out and told me I shouldn't have lowered the flaps; that could have made the problem worse if only one had come down.  I was again annoyed by this since she didn't seem to have many good suggestions during the incident.  What had she been doing inside?  She must have been freaked out, I decided.  I certainly wasn't!

A few years later she was hired by American.  Affirmative action, I thought.  She certainly wasn't a very good pilot!

As I kept flying (and as I started skydiving) I met a few more pilots.  I remember two who were so-so pilots, but in my mind certainly better than Stacey.  One was Harry R, the pilot for Skydive Long Island.  The other was Will, a guy I got to know at Bridge Day in 1992.  Both were competent in my mind but I remember a few things that worried me.  

At SLI we never got to jump due the volume of students and our single 182.  Harry Parker and I decided we'd show up before 8am and make an early morning jump so we could get in the air.  One morning we showed up and Harry R started the plane and began to taxi.  The DZO came out and screamed at him for a good ten minutes - he didn't want anyone to taxi the plane until the oil temperature was in the green.  After he retired to the trailer where he had been sleeping, Harry R was visibly shaken.   Harry Parker told him to take a minute, take a few deep breaths, and calm down.  He looked better after that and we made that early morning jump.

I flew with Will a few times while he was flying Otters.  And he always seemed to be just a minute behind things.  Once when someone started spotting he yelled back "JUST GIVE ME A MINUTE!"  We laughed.  He flew jump aircraft for years before he finally got hired by an air freight company.  No DEI for him!

In 1993 Harry R was flying a load of students when he lost power on takeoff.  He turned downwind to attempt a closed-traffic landing.  On the downwind he was pointed at a 600 acre sod farm just across the road from the DZ.  But he tried to make it back to the runway anyway.  He actually made it back, stalling the aircraft and hitting almost on the centerline.  He died.  The jumpmaster was paralyzed.  The students survived with minor to severe injuries.  Was he anticipating the DZO yelling at him for landing in a sod farm instead of the runway?  Or did he just get fixated?  Or did he misjudge his speed and altitude?  We'll never know - but it cost him his life.

In 2006 Will had moved on to flying freight in small jets.  He was flying a Falcon DA-20 in icing conditions.  On an approach he not only did not turn on the anti-icing system, he let his speed decay to just above stall speed during the approach.  The addition of the ice raised the stall speed a bit.  The plane stalled at a low altitude and crashed; all three crew in the cockpit died.  Again we will never know exactly why.

While I was thinking about this I looked up Stacy.  She had gotten a degree at Embry-Riddle before I flew with her (I never knew that) and afterwards she flew for American Eagle, getting her ATP in the process.  She then switched to UPS and flew 727's, DC-11's and finally 757's and 767's, which she still flies today. 

I have to wonder which pilot Winsor would have preferred flying an aircraft he was on, given that "no one gets a pass."

I once had a flap jack screw fail on a Turbine Beech on jump run. Because it was apparent I asked and kept the exits to small groups. No Biggie. On landing the trick was to control airspeed while the lazy flap lowered. With respect to Stacey, white, black, or otherwise it's a tricky bit to work out and most young flight instructors wouldn't have a clue.

[billvon 3,050]

"When working with lethal service, no one gets a pass."

Another story of a fatal crash and a DEI pilot.

This takes us back to Air Algerie Flight 6289 in 2003.  The captain was Boualem Benaouicha.  He had around 10,000 hours total flight time, of which 1000 were in type.  The copilot was Fatima Yousfi, who was the first woman ever to fly for an Algerian airline.  A DEI hire for sure. By 2003 she had 5200 hours, including 1300 in type.

She showed up for her flight on time.  The captain was late.  She did the walkaround, filed the flight plan and entered everything into the FMS.  She was concerned because based on the temperature, runway length, load etc the aircraft was right at the limits of its performance, and very close to the max takeoff weight.  

Benaouicha finally showed up, very late.  Yousfi tried to start the takeoff briefing (including, of course, performance and engine out procedures) but Benaouicha was chatting up a flight attendant, who was in the cockpit for some reason.  She tried several times before he told her to cut it out and get ready to go.

They got taxi and then takeoff clearance.  Yousfi was the pilot flying, and she started the takeoff roll.  They rotated and started climbing.  As soon as they had positive rate Yousfi told Benaouicha "Gear up."  He did not raise the gear, for some unknown reason.

Seconds later they lost a vane inside engine 1, and both the high pressure and low pressure turbines got chewed to bits.  "What's this?" Yousfi said, captured on the CVR.  She started the memory items - pitch down, rudder to correct yaw, identify bad engine, increase power on good engine.  All the more critical because at their takeoff weight and temperature, they could barely climb on one engine.

They could not climb, however, with the gear down.

At this point, Benaouicha seized the yoke.  "Let go!  Let go!" he told her.  "I've let go," Yousfi replied.  "Gear up?"  He was now the pilot flying, so he was the one who had to make that call.  He didn't say anything - but immediately pitched back up to the climb attitude.  He then reduced power on the good engine, likely because he had misidentified the failed engine.

There were several more instances of Benaouicha yelling at Yousfi to "let go."  She kept telling him "I let go!"  This was likely due to the unexpected nose-down forces that Benaouicha was experiencing; the airspeed was falling off and the aircraft was trying to nose down to recover to trim speed.  It was taking more and more effort to hold the nose so high.

Benaouicha kept the nose up and the airspeed continued to bleed off.  "Please!" shouted Yousfi.  At this point both the stall warnings and the GPWS were blaring at Benaouicha, but he kept the nose high for the remainder of the flight.

The plane stalled at 400 feet, rolled and crashed into the desert.  There was only one survivor.

The Algerian Commission of Inquiry placed most of the blame on Boeing and the engine manufacturer, despite the fact that the aircraft could have climbed on one engine if handled correctly.  They also recommended that pilots train on control handoff procedures.  But of the odd seizing of control by the captain - they did not look into that.  This may have been because Algeria has a very patriarchial society, and taking over from the woman might simply have been the expected reaction of any male captain in their airline - even if that woman has more time in type than he does.  They did conclude with something that perhaps showed some realization of their oversights; they recommended that the Ministry of Transport create an independent agency to investigate plane crashes.

No one, of course, will ever know for sure what happened.  But we do know that the pilot flying (Yousfi) had begun the engine-out procedure - she leveled off, and on the flight recorder, the airspeed held steady for a few seconds.  Then Benaouicha grabbed the yoke and started yelling at her to get off the controls.  Most of his communication in the last 30 seconds was him yelling at her to let go.  He pulled the nose up, pulled power on the working engine, and the rest is history.

Had he let the DEI hire continue doing her job, the 102 people who died in that aircraft might be alive today.  But in Algeria, the man gets the pass.

[gowlerk 2,238]

9 hours ago, billvon said:

Had he let the DEI hire continue doing her job, the 102 people who died in that aircraft might be alive today.  But in Algeria, the man gets the pass.

This is the main reason for CRM training. Overcoming cultural biases and authoritarianism.

[jakee 1,553]

15 hours ago, billvon said:

Had he let the DEI hire continue doing her job, the 102 people who died in that aircraft might be alive today.  But in Algeria, the man gets the pass.

It's often the case that minorities have to continue to work harder to gain and maintain respect once in post than those who can just look the part and skate on with the minimum of effort and an assumption of competence. 

Like Karin Jean-Pierre being characterised as the White House DEI hire despite being significantly more experienced than any of Trump's ever increasingly Aryan Barbie looking press secretaries yet Fox never complains about them being hired for reasons other than merit. Obviously, to people like Fox hosts and Winsor, many forms of racism are still acceptable.

[jakee 1,553]

5 hours ago, gowlerk said:

This is the main reason for CRM training. Overcoming cultural biases and authoritarianism.

'Overcoming' is a strong word. Attempting to reduce, maybe.

[billvon 3,050]

5 hours ago, jakee said:

Like Karin Jean-Pierre being characterised as the White House DEI hire despite being significantly more experienced than any of Trump's ever increasingly Aryan Barbie looking press secretaries

Yep.  JD Vance admitted he would never have been admitted to college without the help of a DEI program to get more lower income people into Ivy League colleges.

But to Trump, Winsor, FOX News et al, DEI is synonymous with "black" and "woman" - and so when you point out Vance's use of DEI, they just look at you confused.  "But . . . he's white."