Colgan crash (moved from Incidents)

[JohnMitchell 16]

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The Colgan Air pilots that crashed in NY PULLED back on the yoke in a stall. Were they stupid? No! They were not trained!

They were trained. They just didn't heed the lessons very well. The captain had flunked a few sim rides before finally passing. Certainly he was not at the top of the class. The F/O was derelict in her duties of maintaining a sterile cockpit and monitoring the performance of the captain, which was deficient. I would put them down as ineffective and unprofessional at best. Sorry.

[Lucky... 0]

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The Colgan Air pilots that crashed in NY PULLED back on the yoke in a stall. Were they stupid? No! They were not trained!

They were trained. They just didn't heed the lessons very well. The captain had flunked a few sim rides before finally passing. Certainly he was not at the top of the class. The F/O was derelict in her duties of maintaining a sterile cockpit and monitoring the performance of the captain, which was deficient. I would put them down as ineffective and unprofessional at best. Sorry.

The stick shaker triggered and idiot pulled back. They had to have had the training, just used it as an obstacle rather than a real lesson.

I heard the audio of the minutes lesding to the crash and the Captain sounded unaware and green.

[JohnMitchell 16]

and the copilot passive and unassertive.

[billvon 3,009]

>The Colgan Air pilots that crashed in NY PULLED back on the yoke in a
>stall. Were they stupid? No! They were not trained!

They were stupid. Anyone who has gotten even a private pilot certificate gets stall training - and pulling back on the yoke during a stall is never the right thing to do.

[NickDG 23]

Here's the answer . . .

"The crew of four was led by Captain Marvin Renslow, age 47, of "Lutz," Florida."

NickD

[pchapman 279]

LOL, Nick nails it on the head again!

But seriously, I also got the impression from the NTSB report that the stall training they did at Colgan was so "mild" that it reinforced the wrong behaviour, whether in the sim or in the air. It sounds like a bit of an industry standard too.

The pilots got so used to having to fly out of an incipient stall with minimal altitude loss, or fail the evaluation. Therefore entirely wrong behaviour had been reinforced, when they actually had to deal with a real stall where you couldn't just power out of the problem and pull out immediately.

The subject is obviously complex so a short post can't do the topic justice. And on that particular flight there may have been other misperceptions on the part of the pilots -- the whole icing and tailplane stall thing.

Here are a couple quotes from the NTSB report showing the issue I'm talking about:

From one of the practice stall profiles (my emphasis):

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PF maintains altitude and
heading
PF calls “stall,” advances
power to rating detent, and
calls “check power, flaps 15”
PM calls “positive rate”

From the main text:

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During postaccident interviews, the NTSB learned that, during the approach-to-stall
recovery exercises for initial simulator training, pilots were instructed to maintain the assigned
altitude and complete the recovery without deviating more than 100 feet above or below the
assigned altitude, which had been previously required by the practical test standards for the
checkride.99 Some company check airmen indicated that any deviation outside of that limit
would result in a failed checkride, but other company check airmen considered this altitude
limitation to be a minimal loss of altitude (which is consistent with the current practical test
standards).
Company training personnel and Q400 check airmen stated that demonstration of the
airplane’s stick pusher system was not part of the training syllabus for simulator training at the
time of the accident. Nevertheless, one check airman indicated that he demonstrated the stick
pusher during initial simulator training. The check airman stated that most of the pilots who were
shown the pusher in the simulator would try to recover by overriding the pusher. Most of the
company pilots interviewed after the accident reported that they had not received a
demonstration of or instruction on the stick pusher.

[JohnMitchell 16]

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But seriously, I also got the impression from the NTSB report that the stall training they did at Colgan was so "mild" that it reinforced the wrong behaviour, whether in the sim or in the air.

Nevertheless, one check airman indicated that he demonstrated the stick
pusher during initial simulator training. The check airman stated that most of the pilots who were
shown the pusher in the simulator would try to recover by overriding the pusher. Most of the
company pilots interviewed after the accident reported that they had not received a
demonstration of or instruction on the stick pusher.

Well, it's starting to sound like crap training as well as an ineffective aircrew. That stall training it the result of trying to keep everything "safe" - just teach approaches to stalls, don't teach the scary stalls themselves. Can you imagine our fatality rate in skydiving if we only taught "approaches to cutaways" and never had them practice grabbing the handles and pulling?

I've always said that every simulator has its limitations, but I've flown in those full motion aircraft simulators. They have very few limitations. Full on stalls could and should be trained in those, with no danger to anyone. Anything less is criminal.