Mr.Nuke

In any event, it was likely a high speed exit as sport jumping goes, but not a brutally mauling high speed. The 727 sans all the other passengers was flying light. That would give lower stall speeds thus allow slower flight for a given flap setting in comparison to a fully loaded plane. 377 Recall though that they were packed with fuel. 50,000 pounds adds a significant amount of weight. They were probably heavier than the PDX to SEA segment where the hijacking started.

The problem is PDX likely wasn't looking. Keep in mind 305 wasn't the only flight in the radar operators sector that night (I'm fairly certain It would've been receiving priority though). Also remember that 305 was given instructions to squawk a special transponder code when Cooper jumped. This certainly would have received the controller's attention. Of course that code never came, and no one was certain that a jump occurred until the plane landed in Reno minus a passenger.

Flaps 30 or 40 on most planes requires near landing speeds. In fact, I pulled out my 737 reference charts and for both 30 and 40 instead of giving a specific knot number it simply says Final Approach Speed. There likely would be a slowdown associated with lowering the flaps. Thanks Nuke (I always think of you as The Cooler for some reason :) What flabbergasts me, is that this 30 degree flap/slowdown issue was in the FBI summary report for 37 years. And so it's clear that Cooper jumped at a reasonable exit speed right? And the story's been put in the papers forever that he jumped at some crazy speed. I mean, the more we learn, I'm expecting the jumpers out there to be thinking: easier and easier jump? It depends on what you consider reasonable exit speed and clear. I'm looking at files that accompany accompany a payware 727 plane for a flight simulator. I'm not sure how accurate they are, but they have the maximum extension speed for 30 degrees as 180 knots. Other than Towsaw there is nothing to confirm the drop to 145 knots.

I have a request in with the Special Agent who makes nicknames. In this context Sluggo can use "very near" because if they are giving 305 a PDX altimeter setting it generally means that the plane is very close to the airport. The altimeter settings are derived from the closest weather observation station in the vicinity of the plane's path. And if we take the radar data and assume it is accurate, the plane is very close to PDX at 8:15.

It almost looks like an F-104 to me.

Elaborate. To me they don't start getting "up to something" until later when they start talking about slowly taking the plane up to limit the oxygen. If you put that one altitude report in context it certainly appears to be erroneous. Several minutes before they report being at 10,000. One minute after they are advised they will need to climb to 11,000 at some point, and at 8:33 they report they are still at 10,000.

Flaps 30 or 40 on most planes requires near landing speeds. In fact, I pulled out my 737 reference charts and for both 30 and 40 instead of giving a specific knot number it simply says Final Approach Speed. There likely would be a slowdown associated with lowering the flaps. I guess I thought we had agreed on this already? Why else would you give the flaps and gear down remark? The flaps ensured Cooper's speed requirement was being met (gear down helped as well). And yes it would be very easy to look out either side and confirm the flaps are indeed down and in the same position that they were before. Otherwise he would need to go up to the cockpit, which is clearly something he didn't want to do.

Yeah we are fairly certain it wasn't Scott. Scott was likely the one working the radios that night.

No problem, that does seem to be my role around here lately though, doesn't it? I'm still glad we are able to straightened out that whole third officer episode with you.

I'm not going to pay to read the article, but combined with the whole Himmelsbach retirement incident this is rather curious. Can you elaborate on the other discrepancies snowmman?

I believe it was Anderson who was on the re-enactment flight. If Scott was listened to anymore than the others it was probably to do with seniority more than anything.

My issue was with this statement. It wasn’t with whether or not Cooper saw the lights of Portland/Vancouver. Based on where Cooper likely jumped, they would be fairly hard to miss. My issue is that blanket statement isn’t necessarily true. Cooper and Rataczak didn’t have the same view, which gets us to this. Again, yes a person can move around, but you are still rather limited. And no he couldn’t (or at least he didn’t) move to right behind the cockpit door. I’m fairly sure Cooper demanded the section curtain to be closed, but the crew likely would’ve left the cockpit door open considering the situation. Yes, Cooper had access to the views Rataczak had in the cabin, but clearly didn’t use them. So I think with a reasonable degree of certainty we can say Cooper stayed in the back (economy) portion of the plane. Heck he likely stayed by the backstairs after he opened them. The curious thing to me is Rataczak did not say "lights of Portland" but "suburbs" of Portland. The city itself? But we are talking not only about Portland but Vancouver and Portland. Two sets of large lights. I think the assumption of Vancouver was a fair one. Yeah I mean it depends on the cloud cover. My problem with this is like using lake Merwin to a much lesser extent you are screwed if there is heavy cloud cover in this case. If you buy the theory that Cooper planned V-23, then you concede he has aviation experience of some sort likely pilot training to an extent. I just can’t see someone picking V-23 and then not using the route and then not using the Maylay and BTG turns as their points. It is the perfect route to do something like that on. On the other hand, if you buy the theory that Cooper really didn’t care where he went since he planned to jump soon after takeoff then how does he know what he is seeing is Portland? Gracias, Senior Nuke.

Not necessarily. Your statement seems to imply that Rataczak and Cooper had an equal view which they did not. Rataczak is sitting at the front of the plane with a near 180 degree view in front of him. Cooper is either looking out side windows, which gives you little indication of what is in front of you. Or he is standing at the backstairs giving no indication at all of what is in front of him. But again to know where you are in "general terms" on a plane, if you know the route doesn't require seeing anything. REPLY> I knew some one would say this. All he has to do is look out the windows, the cabin is dark. Or out the back of the aircraft at the direction of skyglow. He knows Vancouver and Portland are coming up. He knows the area. The way you worded your initial statement isn't always true. If you are approaching a city straight on in an airplane the flight crew is going to see the glow and subsequently the lights before a passenger does. Given the likelihood of clouds that night the fact that Cooper likely had his back to the city, and my experiences that flying at night you get less "night glow" than driving when approaching a city, It isn't as certain as you are trying to make it out to be.

It depends on the cloud cover. On a normal day/night the dam would've been visible from the back or one of the left side seats. If you are planning a specific drop zone than likely not and on a night where we know their was possible precipitation/cloud cover in places you are taking a huge risk on spotting a landmark. After Sluggo made the compass comment I responded saying a compass isn't necessary. If V-23 was picked Deliberately the turn at Malay provides the perfect starting spot. A turn like that doesn't require a compass. Sluggo is thinking like a pilot there. For dead reckoning we like our compass, timing device, and sectional chart. Pilots like landmarks as well, lake the dam. Again though given the conditions, I wouldn't plan it as a primary mark. Given the possibility of bad weather, and the beauty that V-23 is for dead reckoning the dam would be a nice secondary confirmation point as to where you are, but I would be "timing" based on Malay and BTG. I'll have to back over the transcripts... I will say that I would take a watch over a compass in this case.

Not necessarily. Your statement seems to imply that Rataczak and Cooper had an equal view which they did not. Rataczak is sitting at the front of the plane with a near 180 degree view in front of him. Cooper is either looking out side windows, which gives you little indication of what is in front of you. Or he is standing at the backstairs giving no indication at all of what is in front of him. But again to know where you are in "general terms" on a plane, if you know the route doesn't require seeing anything.

Thanks Crket. The air stairs at 20 degrees shouldn't really matter much here. My point in raising the placard issue is that it is probably the best piece of evidence we have. The money is nice, but as the discussions here have indicated there is still a fair amount of uncertainty and multiple variables affecting how it may have arrived where it did. With the Placard you only have where Cooper let it go, and how and where it fell/landed. We still aren't sure on the 1971 map. Where was the radar? How detailed was the information presented and the information saved? How/what information was used to make the map? At this point, I put a fair amount of trust in the map simply because it looks like a plausible hand flown flight path. Getting as precise location as possible for the placard would lend credence to the map.

That depends on who you are. The money find obviously through the FBI's previous theory of a Lake Merwin area jump out. Combined with the hydrology data pointing to a place like Washougal, and Captain Scott paying Himmelsbach a visit at his retirement party, they are apparently willing to move it around a bit. The map data certainly seems plausible for a hand flown flight. We still don't know the Radar source, anything the detail of the data, or how the data was transferred to that map. An aside for Crket: How much detail do you have about the location where the placard was found? In his book, Himmelsbach says 13 miles east of Castle Rock, but after reading the book I'm not sure I trust what he says in it. The placard location is the best piece of information as to where the plane was.

Pretty darn sure. A light indicator will go off on the overhead panel. Most aircraft (I can't speak for certain of the 727) also have an auditory indicator to let the cabin crew know of a crew call. Edited to add: Why would he need to know where he was based on cabin conversations?

Reply: Here is a map of the swath from BTG down to Portland Intl Airport. You will see Heisson (eyewitness report), BTG VOR on V23, Orchards (possible DZ), and Portland ITL where it all started. If money winds up on the ground near the Columbia in this swath, it has a much easier route to going just up to the bend of the river thenwashing back inland in a flood, later winding up at Tina Bar. That's one of four possible theories. What are you trying to do. According to the best information we have the plane didn't actually overfly BTG. It was a mile east. The Heisson story doesn't make sense, plus you location is off by about a mile. For it to check out the plane would have to be 5.5 miles off off of V-23 and about 6 miles off of the radar track. " ....Dennis Levanen, who lives in the Heisson area, said he vividly remembers the airplane flying directly over his house on Thanksgiving Eve in 1971. He quibbles with the FBI’s flight path of the airplane, noting that it appears several miles west of where it actually flew. A plane at 10,000 feet is no where near huge. At night with no lights, partially to mostly clouded skies there is no way you would see it. Lastly, why is PDX marked?

Crket, because roughly 3% of the money was found we know for certain that Cooper lost the other 97%?

Glad you found this. I was going to bring it up in a couple of days here, but was waiting to see if someone would find it. Keep in mind it was Boeing saying it wasn't possible in 1971. What the World Airways crew likely did is raised their rotation speed, staying on the ground quite a bit longer than they normally would have. With added speed you can get in the air with a lower climb out. You are still putting the plane in risk of damage to the stairs and add a higher risk to things like the landing gear and flaps for exposing them to higher than normal operating speeds. Of course in the World Airways incident they really didn't have a choice and just wanted to get the heck out of their. The plane had already been damaged suffering numerous gun shot holes and a grenade going off under the wing.

Jo, What does knowing what time the helicopter got airborne and where it turned back to Portland tell you about anything? If you want to elaborate on the point you are trying to make that would be great. Thanks. Snowman said: This theory doesn't make much sense. So in short we can say if we know where the helicopter was we know 305 wasn't there so that somehow gives us insight into that night? That also doesn't make much sense. Remember we are taking about night conditions and an airliner that was flying nearly twice as fast as the Huey could. Also Cooper demanded that 305 flied without lights. This means it would be quite plausible to fly right past the plane and not see it. I don't think that was the goal of sending a helicopter up though. 305 was given special instructions to squawk a special transponder code and to flash its lights when Cooper jumped. Of course that never happened. They likely sent the helicopter up figuring that Cooper would jump fairly early, 305 would signal that he jumped, and they could then pinpoint the area and get the helicopter there in enough time to catch him if he survived the jump. And yes they likely would've been fed radar vectors and no they would not have to worry about crashing as typical protocol would be to fly at a different altitude.

Sluggo, I know you are busy with the family, but if you get a chance... Do you have a higher resolution copy of the sectional with the flight path on it? I'm guessing you posted the highest resolution Crket sent you. I ask because I may have found what 120.9 is (in a more detailed sense). 120.9 is Portland-Troutdale's (KTTD) tower/CTAF overnight. I realize frequencies can change over the years. However, if you look at the 1971 sectional, the tower frequency is clear 120.something. The angle at the top of the number isn't right for a 5, the shape isn't quite right for a 6, but it looks just right for a 9 (plus their are two clearer 9's right next to the number in question). The final kicker is the 254.3. Though it has been removed from the current sectional it is still in the airport data page at airnav. http://www.airnav.com/airport/KTTD

Often, when no confusion will be created, only the last two numbers or letters are given without any other read-back. Such as when a smart-assed jump pilot was flying Cessna 182 N69BS, the response was shortened to: BS. Thanks Guru that was meant to be my shortest response, but I finally got around to posting at almost 2:00 a.m. when I wasn't fully thinking. If there is really minimal traffic on the frequency I've heard plenty get away with either reading back the altimeter setting like 30.03 or the frequency twenty point nine and being doing with it.

Actually, that's the way we talk when things are going normally. The objective is to use as few syllables as possible to avoid tying up the frequency. That's the sign of a competent, relaxed pilot. When pilots start getting really wordy, that would be a sign of stress or discomfort. Well put. As both Sluggo and yourself noted the object is to communicate the correct information in as short of time as possible. Frequencies can become crowed places in busy airspace and it is important to keep your messages short and concise. I'll try and break down a basic conversation establishing contact with a controller a little further for the non aviators. Seattle Center, Cessna N123B (November-one-two-three-bravo) with you at 10,000. General aviation uses the plane's registration number (airlines obviously use a designated company call sign and the flight number) as the call sign, proceeded by the make of the plane. On first contact you also give the full tail number, one subsequent communications with the same controller we can usually simplify it assuming their isn't someone else on the same frequency with a similar call sign. A typical response would be something like this. Cessna N123B, Seattle Center Good afternoon. Radar contact altimeter 30.03 This lets the pilot know the the controller has them on the radar, and they have been informed that the altimeter setting has changed. A response could be as simple as 30.03, 123B. We've given a read back on the altimeter setting to the controller to let them know we have a correct copy. Note we dropped the Cessna and the N, and can keep our communications in the simpler format for the remainder of the time with this controller. When it comes time to get handed off to the next controller you might hear something like this. Cessna N123B Contact Seattle Center on 135.8 Good Day To which a simple response to confirm you have the correct frequency is necessary. From anything as formal as 120.9 for Cessna N123B to as simple as just twenty point nine if the traffic is light. Of course some combination of the above will work just fine as well. You can drop the one in 120.9 because all VHF civilian navigation frequencies have the one in front.