TheSultanofScud

You are, however, responsible for what they do after exit. I'm not a pilot (I wish ..), I'm not American, your FARs do not apply to me, and even I know that. Yeah, I would be responsible if they exited with a propane tank and it landed in a playground. I would be held responsible if I allowed jumpers to exit over a place that isn't designated by NOTAM or authorization as a DZ, particularly if injuries or damages resulted. I would be held responsible, as davelepka indicated, for reserves that were used or at least jumped on my airplane that were out of date. I can be held responsible for all of these things because A) they are outlined, some of them only by implication, in the FARs and B) these are things that pilots have been held accountable for in the past. But I have enough experience, contacts in the FAA, and lawyers in my network to know that your logic is incorrect. I am responsible, to a large extent, for my jumpers. That being said, pilots aren't regularly held accountable in this country for canopy collisions, hook turns that "go in", CRW gone bad, or most other stupid human tricks that result in body bags on the dropzone. It just doesn't happen with those behaviors. This isn't my conjecture, it's also the insight of the regional FAA leadership with whom I just got off the phone. This logic of "the pilot is always screwed" doesn't ring true. If one of these tandems wrap, the FAA inspector's MO is to check the reserve dates, my certificates, the airplanes airworthiness, and then...guess what...he's gone. To drive my point home even more, pilots aren't even required to know BSRs, much less the rules established by United Parachute Technologies. How many pilot have you met that could quote you the FAA regs allll day, but still didn't know a single thing about skydiving techniques or the rules established by USPA? This is because he doesn't have to know them. I know them, because I think that is prudent for a professional and I've been flying jumpers too long to have excuses. This knowledge doesn't make me more responsible as far as the FAA is concerned. Now, if you are implying that I'm going to get dinged in civil court, then that is possible. But in this country, you could sued for anything. It's just a question of whether the plaintiff actually makes it stick. I could sue people on this forum for libel (despite the fact that it hasn't happened), but that doesn't mean I can actually win. I doubt I can contribute anything meaningful to the thread at this point, so I will bow out and wish you all the best and a safe 2010. Again, I invite any of you that find yourselves in the Minneapolis area to come out and fly with us at STC. I'll be happy to take you up. If anyone would like to continue debating pilot responsibility with me, please send me a PM or start a new thread. I've really run out of things to say that are worth reading in this one. Cheers.

You willingness to forgive of this type of behavior has brought it into question. Sparky You keep using the words "forgiving" and "forgiveness". That reflects your choice of words regarding my opinions and conjecture, not my actual thoughts. I don't have to forgive them. I'm not in a position to do so. The fact that I'm acting as an advocate has little to do with my policies and thoughts regarding safety. These guys are friends of mine after we're all done at the dropzone. They don't stop being my friends when they elect to participate in canopy flying that I myself wouldn't engage in. I don't get to choose the techniques and maneuvers used by my jumpers once they exit my airplane. I do get to make my own decisions regarding whether a load should be flown and how it should be flown. I take these decisions very seriously. If you do question my judgment for sticking by my compadres (despite their alleged mistakes), then I invite you to join us at STC for an afternoon or two. I believe you will find that you feel reasonably safe on our aircraft and will, after a few jumps, begin to find yourself in about the same good location after opening just about every time. I take the gig very seriously. I don't believe that my appeal for reasonable consideration in deciding punishments is prima facie evidence to indict me of questionable or poor judgment. Would you shun or F'off your kids or siblings when they do something stupid? That's all I'm saying. I stick by my crew.

My safety protocol, judgment, and adherence to both FARs and BSRs are not in question here; or at my home dropzone. Concerning Tandem CRW: There is certainly something to be said for subjecting unknowing individuals to additional risk. It is, indeed, unacceptable. If my guys get smacked over this, all I'm pushing for is consideration given to the status quo. I'm sure some will agree that degrees of punishments should discriminate between behavior that went on and behavior that no longer occurs.

Allow me to introduce myself. I was the pilot at Skydive Twin Cities last season. I am also the pilot for the upcoming season. I reference the above quote to point something out to the folks around here. The Polanski example is somewhat different from what we have here, as the "Tandem CRW" evidenced in the video could only be described as a "victimless crime". To be even more accurate, what people see in the video isn't a crime at all, but an alleged violation of safety regulations (not criminal in and of itself). To be clear...Polanski allegedly did something wrong (rape) and there was a victim. The TIs you are seeing allegedly did something that is known to be wrong but there are no victims (no injuries, no apparent emotional damages). It would be prudent to charge and jail Polanski after 30+ years because, despite the fact that he probably no longer rapes women, there is still a victim out there who was allegedly raped and never received justice or punitive damages. It would seem less prudent to pull the ratings of the TIs. I assert this opinion because they have altered their explicitly incorrect behavior prior to and without inducing damages of any kind to a customer (at least by way of the wrong/negligent/whatever-you-want-to-call-it behavior). I ask: What is the goal of punishment? Is the goal of punishment to alter the behavior of the instructors? Their alleged behavior has already been altered, n'est pas? They certainly aren't engaging in these practices in the present. I can attest to that. Is the goal of punishment to promote safety within the sport? Safety has already been enhanced; the alleged behavior has been halted. The culture of safety at this dropzone has been strengthened. So what is left? Should UPT or the USPA pull their ratings because they could conceivably relapse? Well any instructor could arbitrarily decide to engage in risky behavior at any time...That's the risk we take by employing imperfect human resources. Should UPT or the USPA pull their ratings out of spite? This is a forum about safety. Spite does little more than create a barrier to communication--which is highly detrimental if we are to learn from these alleged events and discussions. Indeed, spite has no place in any decision or discussion relating to this topic. It's about safety---not retribution. All I'm saying is that some consideration has to be made in evaluating the proper, or at least, logical course of action in handling these men. The punishable behavior that allegedly went on has been stopped. To my knowledge, It has not only been conducted, but most importantly, stopped before it ever actually resulted in injury to a paying customer! I don't condone the alleged behavior. But I believe the powers that be should consider the role and effectiveness of punishment before they employ it. I used the words 'alleged' and 'allegedly' quite frequently in expressing my opinion because I am not willing to explicitly cast blame in this forum. I apologize for any annoyance this may have caused; I just wish to err on the side of courtesy in discussing the mistakes of others. I would like to applaud Mr. Akers for his persistence in addressing a safety issue. I would also like to express my dislike of the personal attacks and flaming that is all-too-typical of internet forums. I believe this should be a place of learning and improvement; personal attacks and spite are an obstacle to this end. Thank you for reading...to those who jump with me or from my aircraft: I look forward to flying with you again. To all others: I hope that you will come out to STC, jump with us, and enjoy an improved dropzone for yourselves.

Chris, I will answer your question and then follow up with what happened to me today. I also saw the new PAC section on diverdriver.com...I will post more information there in the coming days. The typical one-size-fits all power setting for jump run is 18 PSI on the torque indicator and 1850 RPM on the propeller RPM. You give the door below 20 PSI, and give the green light with 18 or less PSI. With a slight descent this generally yields between 80 and 85 knots depending on appropriate pitch. Today I stepped on my Lingham. Today, for the first time, I had to execute an aggressive positive control maneuver to recover from an imminent stall on jump-run. I was flying the typical jump-run at just above 80 knots anticipating several small groups. Typically, when larger groups with multiple floaters manifest, they give me advanced notice of their presence so I can fly a faster jump run...this has become an expectation and an understanding following the Waseka stall that spawned this thread. My assumption was incorrect. This load was to be a 10 way composed of 9 medium to large men and one light woman. The jump-run began in level flight seconds after completion of the climb. I was flying just above 80 knots with 20 degrees of flaps (standard) and approximately 17 PSI of torque...which is 1 PSI less than the one-size-fits all power setting used when jumpers take the door. With every load I've flown so far other than the eight and nine ways, this has been almost negligible within a range of 16-19 PSI at the beginning of jump-run. At 17 PSI, 80 Kts, and 20 degrees of flaps, I was in the typical slow descent I would expect. The biggest jumper on the load was sitting next to me prior to the climb-out and is likely in excess of 6' 4" and 280 pounds. Everything, as far as I remember, was normal at first. According the jumpers, their climb-out was somewhat longer than usual. There were five floaters and five remaining close to the door. . I didn't notice the excessive CG shift until it was too late. As soon as the last and biggest jumper moved to the rear of the plane, trouble started. Some seconds after the floaters took the door, I ran out of stick travel on the forward end. I had not changed power settings and up until this point, airspeed had remained at approximately 80 knots or so. The aircraft pitched above the horizon as the jumpers held on, and I rolled left in accordance with the aggressive positive control maneuver I was instructed to use to lower the nose. Single-engine aircraft having engines which were manufactured in the US typically have natural left-turning tendencies (as stated before in this thread)...In the event of an impending stall where the pilot cannot lower the nose conventionally, he or she can take advantage of the airplane's tendencies to dive in turns (like canopies) to lower the nose and prevent the stall. By rolling to the left, the pilot also takes advantage of the left-turning tendencies, which aid in a more rapid and deliberate recovery. Bear in mind, this maneuver does not work when the aircraft is already stalled. This maneuver only works in the seconds leading up to the stall, when the aircraft is still aerodynamically flying and the pilot still has roll-control authority. If this is used when the aircraft has already stalled, and is therefore falling with the jumpers, using this technique could potentially aggravate the situation...IMHO. So there it is...I reference my earlier post. Planning, planning, planning. I put it on myself; I should have been more proactive and known about the group size in my airplane without being told. With 13-14 people it's harder to induce this situation; with the smaller cabin, jumpers have no choice but to remain up front as ballast. The 10 to 12 head loads will stick in my mind...the potential is there to inadvertently crowd the door. As pilots we have to know what groups are getting out and when. We have to understand that jumpers will not be familiar with the CG of specific makes and models aircraft. As much as I desire that jumpers meet me half way (which they always have, otherwise) and alert me when they are putting out large groups, I put this one on myself. I've always scoffed at the notion of someones stalling the nose-heavy PAC on jump-run. I'm eating some of my own words at dinner tonight. Anyone want a bite?

I may be showing up late to the game, but I thought my $.02 might be relevant. I am a PAC pilot who is actively flying at a dropzone. I can tell you that we have routinely been flying large RW groups without issues. Even as recently as last weekend I recall flying at least one 14-way...I don't know how many floaters were hanging out, but from a good glance during the climb-out I can tell you that it was pretty lonely up front. Even with most of the load crowding the door, it was easy to maintain a constant airspeed and attitude without trim. The PAC is a nose-heavy airplane by design. Even the design of the fuel system and the location of the forward tanks is used to offset large groups that typically create an aft and adverse CG. Bottom line: The airplane is designed and engineered to be controllable with a single large RW group. Groups larger than 14 would be challenged to even find room in the aft end of the small cabin to get into an uncontrollable Aft-CG situation For the purposes of flight planning for the actual climb and jump-run: As long as the jumpers are evenly distributed throughout the cabin, the PAC will be within CG. There are several official weight and balance examples located in the PAC750XL Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) which is serial-number-specific to the individual airplane. These reflect at least three different loading configurations for my specific ship. Examination of these and empirical knowledge of the airplane have left me with little doubt about what the PAC can handle. As long as proper planning is used in the final seconds of the pattern and the early seconds of the jump-run, these nasty surprises can be averted. For your information, I prefer to carry no less than 80-82 knots of indicated airspeed as I commence my jump-run, particularly on the large loads. I extend flaps early to achieve the last few hundred feet of climb, lower the nose as I adjust power settings, and give the green light with a slightly nose-low attitude. During the jump run, I carry very little power. Depending on the size of the individual groups, I slowly reduce power and airspeed as the aircraft gets lighter, to give later groups a smoother exit. I use the built in PA system to alert later groups of the slowing ground speed, and thus, the increased need for time between groups. With big ways, I generally carry my initial jump-run power setting for quite some time. As soon as I feel bodies leave, I slowly reduce power such that the engine will be at idle by the time the last few jumpers are hitting the door. In any case, I am in a slight descent with a level or, more often than not, low nose. It is better to lose 2-300 feet and climb out without that prop blast trying to strip you from the plane, n'est pas? Good planning in the PAC=Constant and/or appropriate airspeed + nose-low attitude + appropriate power setting and changes + and awareness of the group numbers and sizes. Doesn't seem too different from most jump planes. Thanks for the thread...It's a worthwhile discussion.